Property as Rent by Chaudhry, Faisal
St. John's Law Review 
Volume 94 
Number 2 Volume 94, Spring 2021, Number 2 Article 3 
Property as Rent 
Faisal Chaudhry 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of St. John's Law Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
363 
PROPERTY AS RENT 
FAISAL CHAUDHRY† 
INTRODUCTION 
What is property?  Over the course of the past two decades, 
legal scholars have reopened this question in a highly visible and 
often fractious way.  On one side of the renewed debate are those 
who have sought to restore an object-centered model of property 
as an in rem right to exclude; on the other are those who have 
sought to reorient the old adage that property is a “bundle of 
sticks” toward a new emphasis on property’s role in forging social 
relations and democratic community.  Sometimes known as a split 
between the “ownership” versus “progressive property” models,1 as 
fruitful as the renewed debate between the exponents of these two 
views has been, it has been equally paradoxical.  This is especially 
so today, after the epochal events of the 2007 financial crisis and 
the ensuing Great Recession, the most profound since the Great 
Depression of the 1930s, which only widened the gap between our 
theories of property in law and its actuality in real world financial 
practice.  Indeed, central to the 2007 crisis was the vast expansion 
of mortgage securitization, a practice involving the assemblage of 
† Assistant Professor of Law & History, The University of Dayton. I am indebted 
to the many who have provided feedback and technical assistance on this Article 
including Sarah Zahid, Duncan Kennedy, Joseph Singer, Toni M. Massaro, Ana di 
Robilant, Rashmi Dyal-Chand, James C. Smith, Jacqueline C. Hand, David Marcus, 
and Robert A. Williams, as well as the organizers of the AALS New Voices in Property 
Law: Junior Scholars Panel. 
1 See J.E. Penner, The “Bundle of Rights” Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 
711, 731–33 (1996); Gregory S. Alexander et al., A Statement of Progressive Property, 
94 CORNELL L. REV. 743, 743 (2009). Object-centered theorists, especially, have char-
acterized the model they oppose in such terms, usually also distinguishing between 
“substantive” or “ad hoc” versus “conceptual” versions of the so-called bundle thesis. 
See Penner, supra, at 723–24, 733; Eric R. Claeys, Property 101: Is Property a Thing 
or a Bundle?, 32 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 617, 617–18 (2009) (reviewing THOMAS W. 
MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES (2007)). Of course, 
the division that has been articulated between the ownership and progressive 
property models in the last two decades can also be linked—as Penner explicitly 
does—to earlier (skepticism about) concerns over the disintegraiton of property 
famously expressed by Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, 22 NOMOS: 
PROPERTY 69 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980). 
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homeowner debt into complex new forms of financial asset proper-
ty in which the individual right to exclude is, at best, of clearly 
secondary importance.2  Suffice to say, amidst the rise of securiti-
zation, it was never the ordinary homeowner who decided whether 
to grant access to her property for the purposes of making it part 
of the other kinds of debt-based assets being sold to distant 
investors on the world’s financial markets.   
Now in 2021, though barely a decade removed from the last 
time the capitalist world economy was in crisis, a new breakdown 
of world-historical proportions has again materialized, having 
been touched off by the global Coronavirus pandemic.  Yet in a 
thoroughly transformed political context that has seen the United 
States visited by what many have called the rise of a quasi-fascist 
form of right wing ultra-nationalism,3 the likelihood that we will 
once again eschew the opportunity to treat the crisis as a basis for 
pursuing a deeper structural transformation of the American 
economy paints to a more ominous picture than the parallel 
decision did after 2007.  This is because if on the eve of the mort-
gage crash, economic life in the United States was already clearly 
overbalanced in favor of financial speculators, corporate welfare 
recipients, and the rich, the cure put in place after 2007 was, in 
key ways, built on intensifying the very tendencies that led to the 
catastrophe in the first place.  Yet with the Coronavirus pandemic, 
especially before the Biden adminstration’s first round of new 
relief in early 2021, the initial phase of the bailout under the 
March 2020 Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act 
found the United States once more responding to a crisis of global 
capitalism by prioritizing the feeding of ever-larger quantities of 
 
2 THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY 
REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINAN-
CIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES 42 (2011), https://www.govinfo.gov/ 
content/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf [https://perma.cc/2FCH-NLD9]. 
3 See, e.g., JOHN BELLAMY FOSTER, TRUMP IN THE WHITE HOUSE: TRAGEDY AND 
FARCE 19–20 (2017); Matthew N. Lyons, Foreword to SHANE BURLEY, FASCISM 
TODAY: WHAT IT IS AND HOW TO END IT (2017); JASON STANLEY, HOW FASCISM 
WORKS: THE POLITICS OF US AND THEM, at xxviii (2018); TRUMPING DEMOCRACY: 
FROM REAGAN TO THE ALT-RIGHT 73 (Chip Berlet ed., 2020); FEDERICO 
FINCHELSTEIN, FROM FASCISM TO POPULISM IN HISTORY, at xxxi–xxxii (1st paperback 
ed. 2019). But see Samuel Moyn, The Trouble with Comparisons, N.Y. REV. BOOKS 
(May 19, 2020, 7:00 AM), https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2020/05/19/the-trouble-with-
comparisons/ [https://perma.cc/CDG5-ZWAR] (striking a somewhat contrary note 
based on the fascism analogy’s tendency to “abnormalize” the administration it is 
applied to relative to the political history of the United States more generally). 
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low- or no-cost money to the wealthy and superrich.4  The reluc-
tance of the unprecedented stock market boom enabled by that 
earlier bonanza of free money should thus continue to give us 
reason to worry about the possiblity that we have hard-wired into 
our political economy an expectation of an endless willingness to 
redistribute resources into the hands of the corporate and investor 
class for the purposes of amassing speculative financial asset 
property of one kind or another.5 
Against the backdrop of possible “déjà vu all over again,” 
therefore, it would be even more unacceptable than it was after 
2007 to allow the gap between property’s lives in legal theory 
versus real world financial practice to remain intact.  Indeed, 
paving the way toward the Coronavirus shock was an aftermath 
of the Great Recession that already saw the rise of various new 
forms of debt-based assets for investors to take ownership over.  
While the most notable of these have been connected to the rise of 
exchange traded funds, the reemergence of junk bonds, and other 
 
4 Compare, e.g., Mark Blyth & Eric Lonergan, This Time, Can We Finally Turn a 
Financial Crisis into an Opportunity?, FOREIGN POL’Y (Mar. 20, 2020, 4:41 PM), 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/03/20/this-time-can-we-finally-turn-a-financial-crisis-into-
an-opportunity/ [https://perma.cc/VZR9-HAZD], with David Dayen, Unsanitized: Bail-
outs, a Tradition Unlike Any Other, AM. PROSPECT (Mar. 25, 2020), https://prospect.org/ 
coronavirus/unsanitized-bailouts-tradition-unlike-any-other/ [https://perma.cc/QY3Y-
DXR7], and Zach Carter, Coronavirus Is a Defining Test and American Government 
Is Failing It, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 02, 2020), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/ 
coronavirus-test-american-government-failing_n_5e7e213fc5b6cb9dc19f199e [https:// 
perma.cc/582P-5E7H]. 
5 There is a variety of cost estimates of the bailouts with a shared perspective on 
the benefits remaining concentrated among the leading financial institutions. See, 
e.g., JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, FREEFALL: AMERICA, FREE MARKETS, AND THE SINKING OF 
THE WORLD ECONOMY 108, 134 (2010); Viral V. Acharya, Deniz Anginer & A. Joseph 
Warburton, The End of Market Discipline? Investor Expectations of Implicit 
Government Guarantees, 2, 3, 33, 35 (May 1, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1961656 [https://perma.cc/65W2-ZSZV]; Deborah Lucas, 
Measuring the Costs of Bailouts, 11 ANN. REV. FIN. ECON. 85, 105–07 (2019); see also 
infra note 158. The account of the former Special Inspector General for the United 
States’ Troubled Asset Relief Program (“TARP”) presents a more general view of how 
the response to the 2007 crisis was deficient in dealing with the proverbial residents 
of Main Street. See NEIL BAROFSKY, BAILOUT: HOW WASHINGTON ABANDONED MAIN 
STREET WHILE RESCUING WALL STREET, at xv–xx (1st paperback ed. 2013). 
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kinds of highly leveraged loan products,6 new forms of real estate 
securitization also quietly emerged.7 
Drawing on one such new form—involving the securitization 
of residential rental payments from single-family homes and their 
ultimate transformation into bond holder claims on interest—in this 
Article I consider why our existing legal theories have been so ill-
equipped to account for the vast expansion of debt-based financial 
asset property, not only after 2007 but really since the 1970s.  Given 
the related increase in economic inequality over these same 
periods, as wealth and income have been steadily redistributed 
upward to society’s narrow band of capital owners, it is all the 
more curious that legal theory has paid such scant attention to 
property’s “financialization.”8  After all, debt-based forms of finan-
cial asset property do not just represent straightforward mecha-
nisms for excluding others from what their respective holders deem 
 
6 While they are technically funds bringing together some array of assets (like 
stocks, junk bonds, gold, etc.), exchange traded funds (“ETFs”) offer investors indirect 
ownership over those assets through shareholding. While in some ways similar to 
mutual funds, ETFs allow for share-based financial asset property that can be 
continuously bought and sold throughout the course of the trading day, including by 
automated mechanisms. ETFs have been on the rise over the last quarter-century, 
especially since 2007. See Itzhak Ben-David, Francesco Franzoni & Rabih Moussawi, 
Exchange-Traded Funds, 9 ANN. REV. FIN. ECON. 169, 170, 174–75 (2017). 
7 Neil Fligstein & Adam Goldstein, The Transformation of Mortgage Finance and 
the Industrial Roots of the Mortgage Meltdown 23–24, 26 (Inst. for Rsch. on Lab. & 
Emp., Working Paper No. 133-12, 2012); see also, e.g., U.N. Conference on Trade and 
Development, Trade and Development Report 2020: From Global Pandemic to 
Proesperity for All: Avoiding Another Lost Decade, at IV–V, UNCTAD/TDR/2020 
(discussing the precarious state of the global economy leading into the Coronavirus 
crisis); The Age of Disorder—The New Era for Economics, Politics and Our Way of Life, 
DEUTSCHE BANK: NEWS (Sept. 9, 2020) [hereinafter The Age of Disorder], https://www 
.db.com/newsroom_news/2020/the-age-of-disorder-the-new-era-for-economics-politics-
and-our-way-of-life-en-11670.htm [https://perma.cc/X3VE-U3TM]. 
8 Literature on financialization from disciplines outside of law is vast. See, e.g., 
DOUG HENWOOD, WALL STREET: HOW IT WORKS AND FOR WHOM 66–67 (rev. ed. 1998); 
ROBERT BRENNER, THE ECONOMICS OF GLOBAL TURBULENCE: THE ADVANCED 
CAPITALIST ECONOMIES FROM LONG BOOM TO LONG DOWNTURN, 1945–2005, at 13 
(rev. ed. 2006); GERALD F. DAVIS, MANAGED BY THE MARKETS: HOW FINANCE 
RESHAPED AMERICA 1, 5, 26–27 (2009); Justin Fox & Jay W. Lorsch, What Good Are 
Shareholders?, HARV. BUS. REV., July–Aug. 2012, at 51–52; Robert M. Solow, How to 
Save American Finance from Itself, NEW REPUBLIC (Apr. 8, 2013) (reviewing BEN S. 
BERNANKE, THE FEDERAL RESERVE AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS (2013)), 
https://newrepublic.com/article/112679/how-save-american-finance-itself [https://perma. 
cc/H3WT-3UKD]; THOMAS I. PALLEY, FINANCIALIZATION: THE ECONOMICS OF 
FINANCE CAPITAL DOMINATION 1, 4–5 (2013); Natascha van der Zwan, Making Sense 
of Financialization, 12 SOCIO-ECON. REV. 99, 101–03 (2014); L. RANDALL WRAY, WHY 
MINSKY MATTERS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE WORK OF A MAVERICK ECONOMIST 141 
(2016); Bonnie G. Buchanan, The Way We Live Now: Financialization and 
Securitization, 39 RES. INT’L BUS. & FIN. 663, 664–65 (2017). 
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valuable.  Rather, they clearly also comprise claims on the disposal 
of society’s productive resources, both in the present and the future. 
Accordingly, in this Article I make a normative case against 
continuing to stake the fate of our economy on the creation of 
exotic varieties of financial asset property, including through ever-
multiplying forms of securitized real estate debt, for those with 
seemingly endless supplies of money capital to take ownership of.  
To do so, I work analytically, historically, and empirically to mobi-
lize an alternative conception in law and economics of what I call 
property-as-rent.  Dating to the very origins of classical economics, 
this conception drew on ideas very different from the notions of 
consumer preference satisfaction and rent-seeking that have come 
to be associated with modern economics ever since the discipline’s 
neoclassical revolution after 1870.9  From the vantage point of 
property-as-rent, the securitization of real estate debt cannot 
simply be justified in terms of promoting liquidity in the financial 
markets or democratizing access to mortgage lending.  Instead, the 
conception of property-as-rent requires asking whether securitized 
financial asset property rooted in real estate value is a deleterious 
means of redirecting resources from productive to speculative use 
by extracting premiums from land’s scarcity.   
In pursuing this aim, the Article highlights a new species of 
post–Great Recession financial asset property that is known 
appropriately enough as the single-family rental-backed security 
(“SFRBS”).10  Birthed amidst uncertainty about the potential of its 
kind for survival, the first SFRBS became available to investors 
only in 2013.  As a variation of the mortgage-backed security 
(“MBS”), as with securitized assets more generally, the SFRBS 
allows yield-seeking institutional investors like pension and hedge 
funds to take ownership over bond debt supported by large assem-
blages of real estate assets.  At the same time, the SFRBS varies 
 
9 A blanket term, “neoclassical,” has come to denote the ensemble of ideas that 
began emerging in earnest only after the “discovery” of the principle of marginal 
utility during the 1860s, which is typically credited to William Stanley Jevons, Léon 
Walras, and Carl Menger. See generally JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, HISTORY OF 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 825 (Elizabeth Boody Schumpeter ed., 1954); MARK BLAUG, 
ECONOMIC THEORY IN RETROSPECT 294, 297 (4th ed. 1985); E.K. HUNT & MARK 
LAUTZENHEISER, HISTORY OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT: A CRITICAL PERSPECTIVE 249 (3d 
ed. 2011). 
10 Throughout the Article I use the term rental payments to distinguish the reve-
nue streams paid by ordinary consumers on housing leases that SFRBS securitize 
from the economic rent that I argue debt-based financial asset property like the 
SFRBS allows its owners to extract from land. While the terms are not unrelated, it 
remains important to keep the distinction in mind. 
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from the MBS in two key ways.  First, most of the assets securi-
tized to date have been single-family homes purchased by private 
equity firms, often at fire-sale prices in the wake of the bursting of 
the last housing bubble.  Second, because these homes are leased 
rather than owner-occupied, the interest that is ultimately trans-
ferred to institutional investors is intermediated primarily through 
the monthly rental payments of their tenant-occupants.  I say pri-
marily because the rapid way the market has evolved has meant 
that some SFRBS offerings have gone on to include in their secu-
ritized asset pools traditional owner-occupied mortgage payments 
as well.   
Before discussing the Article’s organization, a note of preemp-
tive clarification is necessary, given that real estate-backed 
securities, like all forms of debt-based financial asset property, are 
made quasi-tangible only through their denomination in money.  
Accordingly, it may be tempting for the critical reader to refuse 
this Article’s price of admission, perhaps by insisting that legally 
protected financial claims belong to the realms of securities law 
and contractually secured transactions law more than that of 
“property” law.  Beyond the question-begging nature of so insisting 
and the fact that debate in private law theory has never rigorously 
confined itself to a concern only with tangible property, I believe 
such an objection is unwarranted.  As this Article will show, debt-
based financial assets do not float free of any tether.  Not only do 
such assets ultimately make for claims on what are clearly the 
“property” resources underpinning production—and, more indi-
rectly, society’s means of consumption—they also repeatedly take 
form as claims on capital redirected into property’s quintessential 
variety—namely, real estate.11  Therefore, as with the explosion of 
the MBS before, it is no coincidence that the SFRBS is a legal form 
linking investment bank and institutional investor control to 
value that can ultimately be extracted from the ability of the 
quintessential form of property to command a premium due to 
land’s nonproducibility.  Indeed, as I show, such premiums still 
comprise an enormous share of the market value of real estate 
 
11 This point has been widely discussed by historians, geographers, and sociolo-
gists. See, e.g., DAVID HARVEY, SPACES OF CAPITAL: TOWARDS A CRITICAL GEOGRAPHY 
147–48 (2001); Giovanni Arrighi, Spatial and Other Fixes of Historical Capitalism, 10 
J. WORLD-SYS. RSCH. 527, 531 (2004); Neil Crosby & John Henneberry, Finan-
cialisation, the Valuation of Investment Property and the Urban Built Environment in 
the UK, 53 URB. STUD. 1424, 1427 (2016). 
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even today.12  And, of course, it was precisely their capture through 
the possibility of legal control over land rather than any cost 
associated with its production that led the classical economists to 
the now largely forgotten preoccupation with distinguishing un-
earned rent from other earned incomes in the first place. 
* * * 
As for the organization of this Article, it proceeds in four 
Parts.  Part I delves more deeply into why it is necessary to close 
the gap that is further widening between our competing legal 
theories of property and the reality of property in real world 
financial practice.  Here, I canvass the limits of both object-cen-
tered views, as well as the countervailing resurgence of a focus on 
property’s communitarian dimension to demonstrate why the 
neglected conception of property-as-rent serves as such a vital 
corrective.   
Part II then turns to property-as-rent in earnest.  It begins with 
a first Section that discusses some key differences between the 
classical and neoclassical traditions in economics to flesh out the 
notion of consumer preference satisfaction undergirding what is 
usually described as the economic conception of property.  Doing so 
helps to clarify the importance of my own argument that the 
control of rent has long undergirded an altogether distinct eco-
nomic conception of property’s nature.  The remainder of Part II 
then turns to the genesis of the concept of economic rent—a 
cornerstone of classical economic thought going back at least to the 
eighteenth century—and the way it informed thinking about landed 
property in particular.  Here, the Article takes pains to distinguish 
this idea of economic rent both from the diluted version that lived 
on in neoclassical economics after 1900, as well as the idea of rent-
seeking that has dominated law and political science since the rise 
of public choice theory after the 1960s.   
In Part III, I then provide a contextualizing discussion to set 
the stage for Part IV by drawing out the importance of the 
conception of property-as-rent in our own post-1970s world.  Part 
III lays out three key aspects of the relevant context: a first 
concerning the linked growth of inequality and new forms of debt-
based financial asset property, including real estate-backed se-
curities; a second concerning the rise of the Finance, Insurance, 
and Real Estate (“FIRE”) sector of the economy; and a third 
concerning the phenomenon of financial asset-price inflation.   
 
12 See infra Part IV.A. 
370 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:363   
In Part IV, I end by further grounding the Article’s inter-
vention into property theory in the reality of our actual post-1970s 
economy.  Picking up on elements of Parts I to III, Part IV opens 
by drawing on several unique data sets that economist Morris 
Davis has made available in order to isolate the share of land or 
what we can also call site price values in the composition of home 
price values in the residential real estate market at the national, 
state, and metro area levels in the United States.  Here, I graph 
important long-term trends to demonstrate how dependent home 
price values are still on scarcity premiums associated with land 
and hence how property-in-land rent is transmuted, through 
inflated real estate prices, into interest payments to mortgage and 
investment bankers and bondholders.  This, importantly, is the 
case regardless of whether the payment first takes shape through 
a tenant’s monthly rental check to some private equity landlord 
that has bought up single-family homes with leverage or as a 
traditional mortgage payment by an owner-occupier.  In the 
second Section of Part IV, I then put these trends into dialogue 
with the SFRBS as one example of what both the classical and 
early American legal economists would just as well have seen as a 
proprietary claim in the pure overhead charge of land’s economic 
rent.  Part IV concludes by providing a several-pronged normative 
alternative, both to practical reliance on securitization and to its 
traditional justification as rooted in the idea of promoting liquidity 
in the financial markets and democratizing access to credit.  Doing 
so should be particularly timely given the moment of evident 
transition we now find ourselves in as we attempt to move away 
from an initial round of Coronavirus pandemic relief measures 
that concentrated on subsidizing the bailout of Wall Street at the 
expense of a much-needed focus on the mass of society who reside 
on Main Street.  Now more than ever such an exercise in en-
visioning alternatives is thus necessary if we are to facilitate what 
Roberto Unger calls the “democratic experimentalism” and 
“institutional innovation” necessary to meet both the ongoing—as 
well as the inevitable next—crisis with more effective proposals 




13 ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, DEMOCRACY REALIZED: THE PROGRESSIVE 
ALTERNATIVE 5, 16 (1998). 
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I.  WHY RECKON WITH THE GAP BETWEEN PROPERTY IN LEGAL 
THEORY VERSUS REAL WORLD FINANCIAL PRACTICE? 
While the so-called ownership model of property never fully 
went away in the civil law world, in that of the common law world, 
the idea that property comprises a direct connection between 
persons and things is usually seen as the vestige of an untutored 
past.  Even so, over the last twenty-plus years the latter intuition 
has clearly become untenable.  At least since the turn of the mil-
lennium, property’s supposed dissolution during the twentieth 
century has come under increasing attack.  Even before the object-
centered or in rem model started to be reimagined in terms of the 
economics of information and the limited forms the common law 
has allowed landed estates to take through the so-called numerus 
clausus principle,14 the questioning of property’s disintegration 
had begun.15  James E. Penner was the first to call for a definition-
al return to the twin criteria of the right to property’s “thinghood,” 
on the one hand, and the “duty of non-interference” it imposed on 
the world at large, on the other.16  From this standpoint, the 
corresponding right to exclude has once again become the key stick 
in property’s bundle—so much so, in fact, that talk of “sticks” and 
“bundles” has been made to seem like little more than a pernicious 
metaphor. 
Yet these several lines of attack did not simply turn the old 
common sense upside down.  They elicited a corresponding flo-
rescence in defense of property’s social or communitarian and 
relational dimension.17  Importantly, however, this defense was 
not primarily staked on refuting the object-centered model—say, 
by denying the potential information efficiencies of the numerus 
clauses doctrine.  Nor was it based primarily on reemphasizing the 
jural relationality of bundle logic.18  Instead, focus shifted to prop-
erty’s role as a source of “plural . . . values” extending beyond the 
 
14 See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law 
of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 13 (2000). 
15 See Grey, supra note 1, at 69–85, 70. 
16 See Penner, supra note 1, at 713, 802–13; see also JAMES E. PENNER, THE IDEA 
OF PROPERTY IN LAW 68–74 (1997) [hereinafter PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN 
LAW] (making an even more expansive case). Much literature exists from this early 
moment in the resurgence. See J.W. HARRIS, PROPERTY AND JUSTICE 157 (1996); 
Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right To Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 734–35 
(1998). 
17 This has most prominently taken place through the idea of “progressive prop-
erty.” See Alexander et al., supra note 1. 
18 Wesley Hohfeld was the key originator of the focus on property as a jural rela-
tion. See infra note 25. 
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“promot[ion] [of] individual interests” or the “satisf[action] [of] 
personal preferences,” like “just social relationships, just [social] 
distribution, and democracy.”19  In fact, even before Penner, Gregory 
Alexander was picking up on earlier work by Carol Rose20 to strike 
a key contrast between property’s reduction to “commodity”21 and 
its more fuller role as “propriety.”22 
When set off against property-as-commodity in this way, 
property-as-propriety served as a ready way of contesting the 
resurgence of the object-centered model based on a highly intuitive 
anti-economism.  Emphasizing propriety thus served as a correc-
tive to the “widely shared misconception” reducing property’s 
historical meaning in “American law” to “market alienability.”23 
Ultimately, this resurgence of debate has been more than just 
polarizing.  Aside from its inherent fruitfulness, it also has gener-
ated new efforts at finding a middle ground.  In a recent pair of 
articles, for example, Anna di Robilant uses a legal historian’s eye 
to bring the so-called ownership model into chronologically deeper 
dialogue with the view from property’s relationality.  In the first, 
she highlights a third-way “tree”24 model of property that Italian 
legal thinkers were developing at the very same time that Wesley 
N. Hohfeld is said to have inaugurated property’s great un-
bundling in the United States in the 1910s.25  In the second, she 
highlights a half-century of new legal forms for controlling real 
estate such as the community land trust and common interest 
 
19 Alexander, et al., supra note 1 (emphasis added). 
20 See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, Property as Wealth, Property as Propriety, in 33 NOMOS: 
COMPENSATORY JUSTICE 223 (John W. Chapman ed., 1991). 
21 GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY AND PROPRIETY: COMPETING VISIONS OF 
PROPERTY IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT, 1776–1970, at 1 (1997). Other compatible 
work is abundant. See, e.g., JEDEDIAH PURDY, THE MEANING OF PROPERTY: FREEDOM, 
COMMUNITY, AND THE LEGAL IMAGINATION 2 (2010). 
22 ALEXANDER, supra note 21. 
23 See id. 
24 Anna di Robilant, Property: A Bundle of Sticks or a Tree?, 66 VAND. L. REV. 869, 
871–72 (2013). 
25 Given his premature death, Hohfeld’s insights were confined to two main 
articles. In the first, he decomposed ostensibly unitary rights—like that to property—
into a series of “jural correlatives” comprising the four pairs of privilege: no-rights, 
right-duties, powers-liabilities, and immunities-disabilities. See Wesley Newcomb 
Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE 
L.J. 16, 30 (1913). In the second, he argued for doing away with the distinction 
between in rem and in personam when characterizing the elemental jural entitle-
ments belonging to the actors on either side of those correlatives. See Wesley Newcomb 
Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE 
L.J. 710, 712–16 (1917). 
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community that seem to fly in the face of the ostensible strictures 
of the numerus clausus doctrine.26 
In calling attention to the neglected conception of property-as-
rent, this Article also works in part historically.  It does so, how-
ever, through pushing in a new direction more than toward a 
middle ground between existing extremes, each of which can be 
limiting.  With their focus on refuting bundle thinking as a com-
mon missense, for example, object-centered perspectives have 
carried the risk of striking down a straw man, even while offering 
a contrary view too highly abstracted to offer much purchase on 
the world of the real political economy and the still-proliferating 
forms that property has clearly taken therein.27  Indeed, in pursuit 
of reclaiming property as an in rem right, object-centered theory 
has often become bogged down in hair-splitting and difficult-to-
maintain distinctions—for example, between the right “to use,” “to 
exclude,” and “to exclusively determine use”—or in circularly 
invoking the numerus clausus principle as a way out.28  On the 
other hand, even as they have eschewed a full-throated defense of 
the Hohfeldian view from jural relationality, progressive property 
perspectives have tended to draw on the notion of propriety to 
question the reduction of property to its strictly economic con-
ception, only to then end up paradoxically reinforcing that very 
conception.  That is, much of the force of the propriety versus 
commodity distinction depends on assuming that there has been 
only a single way of conceptualizing property economically and 
even that economic conceptualization itself means offering an 
account based on the paradigm of neoclassical economics.29 
 
26 See generally Anna di Robilant, Property and Democratic Deliberation: The 
Numerus Clausus Principle and Democratic Experimentation in Property Law, 62 AM. 
J. COMPAR. L. 367 (2014). 
27 Consider the fleeting way such theories have handled proprietorship over 
money and, especially, monetarily denominated debt. See, e.g., Merrill & Smith, supra 
note 14, at 50 (on security interests); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The 
Property/Contract Interface, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 773, 833–43 (2001) [hereinafter 
Merrill & Smith, The Property/Contract Interface] (same). Penner touches on money 
but says little about more complex forms of debt. See, e.g., PENNER, THE IDEA OF 
PROPERTY IN LAW, supra note 16, at 164–66. 
28 See Merrill & Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, supra note 27, at 792–
96; Penner, supra note 1, at 819 (conceding that our baseline verbal conventions may 
have, already long ago, outstripped any seeming impropriety of envisioning such legal 
entitlements to the exchange value of commodities and assets as “property”). 
29 See generally supra note 9. Utility perspectives did, of course, previously exist, 
even being strongly associated with well-known figures like Nassau William Senior. 
The idea of marginal utility, however, allowed the unworkable tabulation of total 
utility to be set aside and for exchange value to be conceived of as proportionate, not 
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Accordingly, in its next Part, this Article looks back to a long 
pre-Coasian tradition of law and economics to draw out a com-
peting view of the right to property as a means of appropriating 
economic rent—understood more specifically as a stream of un-
earned income—from scarce or monopolized resources.  Alongside 
property-as-commodity and property-as-propriety, this third con-
ception of property-as-rent or property-in-rent traces the work of 
the classical economists.  Importantly, it also remained crucial for 
early institutionalist or legal economists and their legal realist 
inheritors in the United States, even as it was ever further 
obscured within economics in the wake of the discipline’s neoclas-
sical or marginalist revolution after 1870.30 
 
to the labor embodied in a commodity, but to the subjective pleasure derived from the 
last or marginal increment of the commodity that was still worth the consumer’s while 
to consume, relative to other possible consumption choices. See, e.g., TAKASHI 
NEGISHI, HISTORY OF ECONOMIC THEORY 319–20 (1989). 
30 See BARBARA H. FRIED, THE PROGRESSIVE ASSAULT ON LAISSEZ FAIRE: ROBERT 
HALE AND THE FIRST LAW AND ECONOMICS MOVEMENT 127 (1998); Herbert 
Hovenkamp, The First Great Law & Economics Movement, 42 STAN. L. REV. 993, 
1013–14 (1990) [hereinafter Hovenkamp, The First Great Law & Economics 
Movement]; HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE OPENING OF AMERICAN LAW: NEOCLASSICAL 
LEGAL THOUGHT, 1870–1970, at 108 (2015) [hereinafter HOVENKAMP, THE OPENING 
OF AMERICAN LAW]. Some words about terminology are in order. First, it is worth 
noting that Hovenkamp re-labels “neoclassical legal thought” to encompass what 
Fried, following most, calls “Progressive Era” legal thought as well as legal realism. 
Fried’s usage is more like Alexander’s, which charts a movement from Progressive 
Era legal scholars like Commons to Realists by the 1930s. See generally ALEXANDER, 
supra note 21, at 311–51. Hovenkamp’s titular usage does have some benefits. For 
example, “neoclassical legal thought” captures what is usually identified as having 
come before the late Progressive Era in the United States: namely, a period of 
“classical legal thought” after roughly 1860. At the same time, it also evokes the 
parallel emergence of neoclassical or marginalist economics. Here, however, 
Hovenkamp’s usage can also become confusing, given that, as he grants, among the 
legal thinkers he focuses on during his post-classical “neoclassical” era of legal thought 
are individuals who as economists were heterodox “institutionalist” economists 
outside of the mainstream of neoclassical economics. Second, therefore, I use the term 
“institutionalist economists” or “early legal economists” to refer to figures like 
Thorstein Veblen, John R. Commons, Richard T. Ely, and Edwin Seligman in the way 
Hovenkamp generally does outside of his book’s title, because it is more revealing than 
simply calling them “Progressive Era” legal scholars. Third, while I thus differentiate 
such figures from the legal realists, I concur with Hovenkamp that controversies 
around Realism should not obscure the obvious. That is, the Realists were, in essence, 
the lawyer-inheritors of institutionalist economics and championed its lessons 
through a time in the 1930s when the economics profession had thoroughly turned 
against its legacy and toward neoclassical orthodoxy in ways reproducing some 
tendencies of Hovenkamp while also, elsewhere, chafing against them—but focusing 
on classical economists in the United States alone. See Duncan Kennedy, The Role of 
Law in Economic Thought: Essays on the Fetishism of Commodities, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 
939, 967 (1985). 
2020] PROPERTY AS RENT 375 
In calling attention to this now neglected conception based on 
the idea of extracting rent in classical economics,31 I offer a 
different way to think, in theory, about property’s nature.  At the 
same time, as the Article will go on to show, the perspective from 
property-as-rent also offers a better way to make sense of our 
contemporary reality, which for the last four decades has seen 
financial ownership claims on society’s productive resources 
proliferate alongside a concurrent redistribution of wealth and 
income upwards.  Since the mid-1970s, there has thus taken place 
a vast reordering of claims—claims that by their very nature 
extend long into the future—on society’s productive resources via 
legal forms that are ambiguous between providing for control over 
earned income versus unearned rent.  Indeed, as scholars from 
various disciplines have dubbed it, amidst the great eras of the 
economy’s “financialization”32—through both the finance sector 
proper and the related sectors devoted to insurance and real 
estate—most notable has been the even more specific growth of 
debt-based financial asset claims on society’s productive 
resources.33 
 
31 To clarify, I am not suggesting that the significance of institutionalist eco-
nomics—much less, legal realism—has gone unnoticed. However, attention to their 
significance is different from attention to the role of rent in effectively underpinning 
an alternative conception of property going back to the work of the leading classical 
economists, and even all the way back to the seventeenth century. By linking early 
institutionalist economics to an idea of property-as-rent, this Article departs from 
existing scholarship in the history of legal thought in the United States. The overall 
portrait presented here, therefore, is more indebted to work in the history of economic 
thought such as by Walter Eltis, E.K. Hunt, Mark Lautzenheiser, and Michael 
Hudson. See WALTER ELTIS, THE CLASSICAL THEORY OF ECONOMIC GROWTH, at xliii–
xlv (2d ed. 2000); HUNT & LAUTZENHEISER, supra note 9, at 501; and MICHAEL 
HUDSON, KILLING THE HOST: HOW FINANCIAL PARASITES AND DEBT BONDAGE 
DESTROY THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 43–64 (2015). Finally, to diagram the ways that some 
of the themes of this Article cross paths with, or more genuinely intersect, recent 
writings by legal scholars, two last points are in order here. First, in emphasizing the 
very different way rent was conceived in classical versus neoclassical economics, I 
present a decidedly different point of view from that which can be gleaned in Radical 
Markets. See ERIC A. POSNER & E. GLEN WEYL, RADICAL MARKETS: UPROOTING 
CAPITALISM AND DEMOCRACY FOR A JUST SOCIETY 42 (2018). This is notwithstanding 
any overlap in spirit in the policy prescriptions I offer in Part IV of this Article. At the 
same time, much of what I argue about the notion of property-as-rent could well 
benefit, if space permitted, from being put into further dialogue with recent work on 
law and political economy. See, e.g., KATHARINA PISTOR, THE CODE OF CAPITAL: HOW 
THE LAW CREATES WEALTH AND INEQUALITY 40 (2019); MARIANA MAZZUCATO, THE 
VALUE OF EVERYTHING: MAKING AND TAKING IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 5 (2018). 
32 See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
33 The literature overlaps with that on financialization. See, e.g., JULIET B. 
SCHOR, THE OVERSPENT AMERICAN: WHY WE WANT WHAT WE DON’T NEED 19 (1999); 
DAVID GRAEBER, DEBT: THE FIRST 5,000 YEARS 18 (2011); LOUIS HYMAN, BORROW: 
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Surely, then, focusing on the rise of debt-based financial asset 
property-in-rent tells a story different from that through which the 
link between the increasing liquidity of capital and property’s de-
physicalization has usually been told.  That story has typically 
centered on the baseline events surrounding the validation of 
“property in value” through so-called laissez-faire constitutional-
ism in and around the time of the Gilded Age and amidst the rise 
of dispersed ownership with the advent of shareholder equity in 
the modern corporation.34  Of course, in the United States, it is no 
coincidence that the early institutionalist economists and their 
legal realist inheritors pioneered the investigation of these 
themes.  Highlighting the move to “exchange value” and “incorpo-
real property” was thus among John R. Commons’ central preoccu-
pations, just as it was Adolphe Berle and Gardiner Means who 
most visibly raised concerns about the implications of separating 
corporate ownership from control.35 
On one level, then, focusing on property’s conception in terms 
of the extraction of economic rent helps us to make sense of the 
growth of real estate-backed securities in specific and financial 
asset forms in general during the new “Gilded Age” of the 
present.36  In this respect, it turns our attention to an era after the 
mid-1970s that was necessarily beyond the horizon of the first 
 
THE AMERICAN WAY OF DEBT 14 (2012); ATIF MIAN & AMIR SUFI, HOUSE OF DEBT: 
HOW THEY (AND YOU) CAUSED THE GREAT RECESSION, AND HOW WE CAN PREVENT IT 
FROM HAPPENING AGAIN 112–13 (2015). 
34 See, e.g., MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 
1870–1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 145–46, 159, 166–67 (1994); JAMES W. 
ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF 
PROPERTY RIGHTS 89–90 (3d ed. 2008); ALEXANDER, supra note 21 at 248–76 
(contesting the label though not necessarily reaching conclusions so very different); 
David N. Mayer, The Myth of “Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism”: Liberty of Contract 
During the Lochner Era, 36 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 217, 218 (2009). 
35 JOHN R. COMMONS, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF CAPITALISM 11–19 (1924); Murray 
L. Weidenbaum & Mark Jensen, Introduction to ADOLPH A. BERLE & GARDINER C. 
MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY, at ix, ix (Transaction 
Publishers 1991). 
36 The phrase has become a staple in media commentary and scholarship since 
inequality started coming back into visible focus after 2011. See, e.g., Nathan 
Schneider, The New Guilded Age, NEW YORKER (Oct. 12, 2015), https://www 
.newyorker.com/business/currency/the-new-guilded-age [https://perma.cc/S9B9-R942]; 
Paul Krugman, Why We’re in a New Gilded Age, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (May 8, 2014), 
https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/05/08/thomas-piketty-new-gilded-age/ [https:// 
perma.cc/X5ER-PGR5] (reviewing THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY (Arthur Goldhammer trans., Belknap Press 2014) (2013)). Rigorous 
scholarly discussion of inequality, however, has been afoot, even if given little 
attention, from much earlier. See infra note 119. 
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generation of legal economists and their early legal realist inheri-
tors as well as the legal historians who have remained interested 
in their work.  On another level, focusing on property’s conception 
in terms of rent also serves as a corrective to the way indifference, 
antagonism, and time have invariably lessened the impact of the 
work of the early pioneers.  For example, consider Berle and 
Means whose attention to the separation of corporate ownership 
and control as a potential source of inefficiency was largely forgot-
ten already in their own day, with neoclassical economists largely 
inverting the lesson to be drawn from their work.37  Indeed, as 
neoclassicism continued its ascent after the 1930s, the main 
symbolic valence that came to surround the phenomenon of 
dispersed corporate equity was that of the vaunted “democratiza-
tion” of shareholding.  Moreover, this was despite the uncontrover-
sial facts about how highly concentrated the holding of stock assets 
has always been, being confined to no more than a tiny sliver of 
the population, especially on any significant scale.38 
A final reason why reckoning with debt-based financial 
property-in-rent is warranted is because of how surprisingly little 
attention legal scholars have paid to it, whether before or after the 
bursting of the housing bubble.  This has been all the more 
noticeable given that, even despite the role of mortgage-backed 
securities in instigating the Great Recession and its aftermath, 
financial engineering has hardly ceased in continuing to create 
new legal mechanisms for capturing economic rent, including from 
land.39 
 
37 HOVENKAMP, THE OPENING OF AMERICAN LAW, supra note 30, at 172–76. 
38 See HENWOOD, supra note 8, at 56–114 (treating this issue extensively); see also 
PIKETTY, supra note 36, at 15, 24 (figuring this issue into many of the trends that are 
empirically documented). Another excellent source of current figures is William 
Domhoff’s “Who Rules America” series. See G. William Domhoff, Wealth, Income, and 
Power, WHO RULES AMERICA?, http://www2.ucsc.edu/whorulesamerica/power/ 
wealth.html [https://perma.cc/4UN7-HRPV]; see also Benjamin Landy, A Tale of Two 
Recoveries: Wealth Inequality After the Great Recession, CENTURY FOUND. (Aug. 28, 
2013), https://tcf.org/content/commentary/a-tale-of-two-recoveries-wealth-inequality-
after-the-great-recession/ [https://perma.cc/XN8L-9LGZ]. 
39 Indeed, warnings of a return to pre-crisis levels of risk were well underway only 
a half-decade after 2007. See J. David Cummins & Mary A. Weiss, Systemic Risk and 
the U.S. Insurance Sector, 81 J. RISK & INS. 489, 489–90 (2014); Christopher L. Culp 
& J. Paul Forrester, Have Pre-Crisis Levels of Risk Returned in U.S. Structured 
Products?, 21 J. STRUCTURED FIN. 10, 10 (2015); Natasha Sarin & Lawrence H. 
Summers, Have Big Banks Gotten Safer? 1 (Sept. 15–16, 2016) (unpublished working 
paper) (on file with Brookings Papers on Economic Activity); JACK RASMUS, SYSTEMIC 
FRAGILITY IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 35–38 (2016); Asset Prices: The Bubble Without 
Any Fizz, ECONOMIST: BRIEFING (Oct. 7, 2017), https://www.economist.com/briefing/ 
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II.  ANOTHER LAW AND ECONOMICS: PROPERTY-AS-RENT 
In Part II, this Article now turns its attention more fully to 
the conception of property-as-rent that I argue was formative to 
economics before the neoclassical revolution, and that continued 
to influence early institutionalist or legal economists in the United 
States like Thorstein Veblen and John R. Commons.40  By pointing 
to the potential wealth-siphoning and -destroying effects of 
property, this alternative conception was distinct not only from the 
extra-economic idea of property-as-propriety but also from the idea 
of property-as-commodity, especially as it has been inflected by the 
paradigm of neoclassical economics. 
Before disinterring the conception of property-as-rent, two 
preliminary caveats are necessary.  First, Part II makes no at-
tempt at exhaustively summarizing how concern with the ap-
propriation of land rent intersected with thinking about property 
in classical economics as a whole—that must be left to a different 
article.  Second, nor does Part II advert to capture any singular 
essence of classical economics as if to suggest that it was a more 
uniform body of thought than it actually was, or that it shared 
nothing with economics after the neoclassical revolution.  
Obviously, the notion of an auto-adjusting market—a notion on 
which neoclassical consumer theory, as well as post-Coasian law 
and economics, has relied—did not emerge out of thin air.  Rather, 
like its neoclassical counterpart, classical economics was also 
generally premised on the idea of market-clearing equilibrium.41  
Yet even if more gradual than suddenly revolutionary, the advent 
of neoclassicism clearly did involve some kind of profound break 
 
2017/10/07/the-bubble-without-any-fizz [https://perma.cc/ES3F-E6ZH]; Jim Reid et 
al., Long-Term Asset Return Study: The Next Financial Crisis, 2017 DEUTSCHE BANK 
MKTS. RSCH. 35–36. For a less ominous, although not necessarily inconsistent, point 
of view on euphoria and consternation in the financial markets in the wake of the 
COVID-19 shock see Robert J. Shiller, Making Sense of Elevated Stock Market Prices, 
N.Y. TIMES (March 5, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/05/business/stock-
market-prices-bubble.html [https://perma.cc/HF89-K7LY].  
40 See supra text accompanying note 30. It is Veblen who coined the term “neoclas-
sical,” although it became ubiquitous only after mid-century. While Veblen is remem-
bered as a sociologist, he is better thought of as a heterodox economist fiercely critical 
of the emerging neoclassical consensus. 
41 That is, market clearing through free rather than perfect competition. See infra 
text accompanying note 50. Of course, among the classical economists were indeed 
figures like Jean-Baptiste Say who raised the idea of supply equaling its own demand 
to a veritable scientific law that still bears his name today. See JEAN-BAPTISTE SAY, 
A TREATISE ON POLITICAL ECONOMY OR THE PRODUCTION, DISTRIBUTION, AND 
CONSUMPTION OF WEALTH 219–20 (Augustus M. Kelley 1971) (1803). 
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from the previous century-plus of “modern” economic theorizing in 
the Western world, which—notwithstanding predominant tropes 
about Adam Smith—generally worked from a very different 
paradigm.42 
A. Different Properties: Classical Versus Neoclassical Economics 
By way of further unpacking the last observation, Section II.A 
considers four more specific features that generally distinguish 
classical from neoclassical economic thinking: a first, having to do 
with the distinction classical thinkers made between natural 
price—and/or value—and market price; a second having to do with 
how neoclassical, or consumer, theory effectively erased the line 
between production and exchange; a third having to do with the 
distinct idea of profit that emerged after the neoclassical revolu-
tion; and a fourth having to do with the distinction between profit 
and rent. 
1. Natural Versus Market Price 
While it is common to assume that the defining question of 
economics is about maximizing behavior in the face of supposedly 
infinite wants, this focus on constrained optimization is better 
understood as the most basic transformation wrought by the so-
called neoclassical revolution.43  For most classical economists, 
before and after Adam Smith, the great question of the discipline 
had more to do with the growth of aggregate output, relative 
prices, and their effect on the distribution of class shares of income 
across society than it did with the metaphor of the invisible hand.44  
In response to this question, the principal answer was not one that 
pointed to the law of supply and demand, which, at any rate, the 
most prominent classical economists saw as only a modulating 
force.  Rather, the answer pointed to the costs necessary to bring 
land, labor, and capital into production, which, as determined 
 
42 See, e.g., Sankar Muthu, Adam Smith’s Critique of International Trading 
Companies: Theorizing “Globalization” in the Age of Enlightenment, 36 POL. THEORY 
185, 193–94 (2008) (discussing the “two” sides of Adam Smith). 
43 Only then, moreover, was the discipline’s guiding question made amenable to 
mathematical representation as a problem of constrained optimization subject to the 
techniques of differential calculus—in no small part by way of emulating a very 
nineteenth-century idea of science, especially physics. See PHILIP MIROWSKI, MORE 
HEAT THAN LIGHT: ECONOMICS AS SOCIAL PHYSICS, PHYSICS AS NATURE’S ECONOMICS 
194–97 (1989); see also infra text accompanying note 47. 
44 ALESSANDRO RONCAGLIA, THE WEALTH OF IDEAS: A HISTORY OF ECONOMIC 
THOUGHT 324–25 (2009). 
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prior to and outside of the process of market exchange, were seen 
as the driving forces behind pricing.45 
Accordingly, a staple feature of classical economism was to 
distinguish between “market price” and “natural price” and/or 
“value”—especially for those like the greatest of the tradition’s 
exponents, the British economist David Ricardo.46  Doing so went 
hand in hand with the overarching concern just noted with work-
ing out a cost of production account of commodity values rather 
than any theory based on the then still unquantifiable notion of 
hedonistic preference.47  Indeed, among the leading classical econ-
omists, the logic of commodity was never simply synonymous with 
preference satisfaction through market purchase—whether, as for 
 
45 See generally ELTIS, supra note 31; RONCAGLIA, supra note 44; HUNT & 
LAUTZENHEISER, supra note 9; see HUDSON, supra note 31, at 53. Most of these issues 
would not reemerge until after 1950 with the so-called Keynesian synthesis and the 
emergence of neoclassical growth theory and development economics. 
46 DAVID RICARDO, ON THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION 
(1817), reprinted in 1 THE WORKS AND CORRESPONDENCE OF DAVID RICARDO 1, 91–92 
(Piero Sraffa ed., 2004). 
47 Of course, by the beginning of the nineteenth century the utilitarian thinker 
Jeremy Bentham had coined the idea of tabulating utility through a so-called felicific 
calculus. However, these unsystematic musings notwithstanding, absent a basic idea 
of marginal utility Bentham’s utilitarianism—let alone the non-utility-based thought 
of Smith, or, say, John Locke—could not sustain any theory of value as subjective 
preference. So long as “pushpin [was] as good as poetry” when the “quantity of 
pleasure” was equal, as Bentham’s utilitarianism famously had to allow, not only was 
“interpersonal comparison[ ]” of utilities impossible, but so too was quantification. 
HUNT & LAUTZENHEISER, supra note 9, at 163; HOVENKAMP, THE OPENING OF AMERI-
CAN LAW, supra note 30, at 112. Marginalism allowed for quantification through 
effectively introducing an ordinal rather than cardinal numbering scheme. However, 
especially for more redistribution-oriented economists during marginalism’s early 
years, there were strong temptations to operate as if what had happened was the 
reverse. That is, the temptation was to imagine that the fruits of marginalism’s 
quantifying mathematization of the discipline were actually ordinal so that relevant 
interpersonal comparisons of utilities could, in effect, be drawn. The issue, however, 
would come to a head, making for the dividing line between the old versus the new 
neoclassical welfare economics, roughly after the First World War. Indeed, a major 
achievement of Vilfredo Pareto as a welfare economist was to help do away with what 
many had come to feel was the embarrassment of earlier neoclassical welfare theory’s 
belief in cardinal quantification through the notional idea that utility could be 
evaluated in terms of units of absolute measure known as “utils.” Cambridge econo-
mist Nicholas Kaldor pushed Pareto’s project even further after the late 1930s. As the 
years leading up to the Great Depression wore on, moreover, the political valence 
attached to the aspiration toward cardinal quantification and interpersonal compari-
son had also shifted, at least within the neoclassical mainstream. This was due to a 
growing antagonism to the progressive strand that had emerged within earlier 
marginalist argumentation favoring income redistribution. See HOVENKAMP, THE 
OPENING OF AMERICAN LAW, supra note 30, at 110–14 (covering some of these 
observations with different emphasis). 
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the neoclassicals, of consumer goods by households from firms or 
of productive factors by firms from households; nor, to any greater 
degree, was the logic underlying the conception of property that 
went with classical economism. 
Of course, the last statement does not mean that classical 
economism had no apologetic streak, including with respect to the 
property that individuals had or acquired in their commodities 
through their role in the class-based hierarchy of income distribu-
tion.48  It is, however, to say that whereas for the leading classical 
economists income distribution was the key determinant of the 
prices of commodities, the direction of causation was generally 
reversed in neoclassical thought, especially after its own theory of 
income distribution was perfected.49  From the very start, there-
fore, the way was more open in classical economics to see within 
the right to property not just a basis for increasing economic well-
being,50 but also its stifling, insofar as property could also be 
identified with rent—as, indeed, it increasingly came to be, 
especially as a claim on land.51 
2. Production Versus Exchange 
To the extent that recent debate has sought to contest the 
object-centered view of property by switching focus to the view 
from propriety—that is, the view from property’s independent role 
in forging social and communitarian relations—it has both 
equated economic explanation with neoclassicism and suggested 
that property’s commodity character is exhausted by the theory of 
 
48 See Kennedy, supra note 30, at 943, 955–57. Given Kennedy’s focus on the form 
of classical legal thought that built on classical as well as early neoclassical economics 
in the fifty years after 1860–1870, his work suggests that the legal extrapolation of 
classical economics had a more pronounced apologetic streak than the economic 
tradition itself did. 
49 For neoclassical theorists, prices thus generally determined income distribu-
tion. As for what determined prices in their picture, this was one of the ways that 
supply and demand—itself now ultimately grounded in utility—was assigned a much 
broader role in neoclassical theory. For the leading classical economists, in contrast, 
supply and demand only helped determine “market price,” which as noted was distinct 
from “natural price.” HUNT & LAUTZENHEISER, supra note 9, at xx, 258. In theory, 
income distribution was thus independent from prices, being the determinant of, 
rather than determined by, natural price. See id. 
50 For the classical economists, increasing well-being corresponded to an increase 
not in “welfare” but “wealth,” both by labor’s foundational input into commodity pro-
duction and, in turn, the gains brought from exchanging them under “free”—though, 
importantly, not “perfect”—competition. See Kennedy, supra note 30, at 942–43, 945; 
see generally ELTIS, supra note 31. 
51 See infra Section II.C. 
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the neoclassical consumer.52  Indeed, this feature of resurgent 
debate has proved especially notable given that it was only as late 
as Hohfeld’s own time when the latter theory came to cover more 
than just consumers in the ordinary sense.  That is, it was still 
another several decades after 1870, the rough origin point of 
economics’ revolution, and only with the development of neoclas-
sical income distribution theory—as the American economist John 
Bates Clark expanded on the canonical work of the famed British 
marginalist Alfred Marshall—that marginalism was able to create 
a perfect symmetry between firms and households.53  On the 
perfected view, assuming competitive equilibrium, households 
were said to maximize utility by making calculations at the mar-
gin about how much of the factors of production they owned to sell 
to firms—in exchange, ultimately, for consumption goods.54  The 
firm, on the other hand, was said to make exactly analogous 
decisions, albeit here about the supposedly continuous marginal 
substitutability of the productive factors it purchased from house-
holds to maximize profits by receiving the moneys ultimately paid 
out for consumer goods.55 
In contrast, among the leading exponents of the thought 
tradition of classical economics, property’s importance was not 
reducible to its role as a source of utility arising from consumption 
choices made at the margin.  Especially for the present purposes, 
more to the point are the competing roles it was assigned—on the 
 
52 Tellingly, on Alexander’s account it would seem that, without proper attention 
to property’s independent sociopolitical or communitarian aspect, “disaggregative” or 
bundle thinking can reveal little more than object-centered views do, especially those 
that presume an unbroken continuity from Hohfeld to Coase. See ALEXANDER, supra 
note 21, at 381–82. 
53 See JOHN BATES CLARK, THE DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH: A THEORY OF WAGES, 
INTEREST AND PROFITS 200 (Cosimo Classics 2005) (1899). The impression is often 
given that classical income distribution theory went into abeyance. However, that 
view is unfounded, having become untenable at least since the work of the famed 
Italian neo-Ricardian economist, Piero Sraffa, and the so-called Cambridge capital 
controversy it helped inspire. See PIERO SRAFFA, PRODUCTION OF COMMODITIES BY 
MEANS OF COMMODITIES: PRELUDE TO A CRITIQUE OF ECONOMIC THEORY 13–14 
(1960); see also BLAUG, supra note 9, at 137–43 (presenting dueling views of Sraffa); 
HUNT & LAUTZENHEISER, supra note 9, at 434–57 (same). 
54 HUNT & LAUTZENHEISER, supra note 9, at 305–07. 
55 One can add that each factor the firm purchases is further portrayed as 
procured for the value of the marginal product it contributes to an output that is then, 
in turn, seen as being sold at cost. In this way, what the factor contributes to the 
output is exactly returned to the factor owner as payment in the same way that the 
payment the factor owner receives exactly corresponds to what is needed to procure 
the output. See generally id. at 286–308 (noting that the resultant picture is one in 
which “profit disappears in equilibrium”). 
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one hand, as a prerequisite for production and hence for bringing 
value into being and, on the other, as a means of garnishing 
revenue generated out of production and hence for siphoning 
value.  The murky line between these roles a matter of continuous 
preoccupation.  After all, it was not by accident that the most 
prominent texts of the classical tradition were focused on the prin-
ciples of political economy underlying the production and taxation 
of an economic surplus over and above ordinary subsistence. 
Overall, then, the once analytically firm line that classical 
thinkers drew between production and exchange was steadily 
eroded amidst the protracted set of intellectual developments that 
made for the so-called neoclassical revolution as an actual histori-
cal process.56  These unfolded gradually after 1870 and extended 
at least into the 1920s, when Vilfredo Pareto refined Léon Walras’s 
ideas57 into a new form of neoclassical “welfare” economics based 
on the “indifference curves” developed by his contemporary, the 
Englishman Francis Edgeworth.58 
Even without saying more, it should thus be clear that 
preference satisfaction exhausts property’s economic conception 
only to the extent that all economic activity is, itself, reconceived 
as a form of consumption choice on the market; this, however, only 
became the case more recently than is generally understood when 
reflexively equating economic thought in general with the 
neoclassical tradition in particular.59 
Importantly, these first two distinguishing features of clas-
sical economism were not unrelated to one another.  That is, in 
classical economics, the market price of a commodity represented 
only a modification around natural price’s tether because natural 
price was more fundamentally tied to the cost needed to produce 
output or a commodity; that cost, itself, was seen as determined by 
the distribution of income among land, labor, and capital, con-
ceived, in effect, as distinct social classes rather than just inert 
 
56 See HOVENKAMP, THE OPENING OF AMERICAN LAW, supra note 30, at 113. 
57 Id. at 207; SCHUMPETER, supra note 9, at 827. 
58 See Lansana Keita, Welfare Economics and Positive Neoclassical Economics, 33 
J. VALUE INQUIRY 335, 339–46 (1999) (discussing the relationship between early 
welfare theory and neoclassicism). Here I am referring only to the Walrasian welfare 
economics of Pareto. An additional strain of neoclassical welfare theory can be traced 
to those who put a greater emphasis on Menger’s version of marginalism. That 
tradition links both to the so-called Austrian School of economics associated with 
Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich Hayek already before 1950 and Milton’s Friedman’s 
Chicago School in the United States after 1950. See, e.g., HUNT & LAUTZENHEISER, 
supra note 9, at 374–75; NEGISHI, supra note 29, at 279–315, 330–43. 
59 See generally ELTIS, supra note 31. 
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factors of production that could be owned by anyone.60  Even 
looking no further than Adam Smith, as he notes repeatedly: 
The whole annual produce of the land and labour of every 
country, or, what comes to the same thing, the whole price of that 
annual produce, naturally divides itself . . . into three parts; the 
rent of land, the wages of labour, and the profits of stock; and 
constitutes a revenue to three different orders of people; to those 
who live by rent, to those who live by wages, and to those who 
live by profit.  These are the three great, original, and constit-
uent, orders of every civilized society, from whose revenue that of 
every other order is ultimately derived.61 
As is possible to infer from no more than the above passage, 
immanent in this way of seeing things was a question about the 
extent to which the return going to each social class was truly 
earned—in the sense of being a payment necessary to bring what 
belonged to its respective members into production.62  That with 
reference to those who owned land—something that was un-
produced—the answer to this question should be in the negative 
became more apparent to leading thinkers in the classical 
tradition after Smith, especially his greatest inheritor, Ricardo. 
3. Classical Versus Neoclassical Profit 
The last observation leads us to a third key difference between 
the classical and neoclassical traditions of economic thinking that 
is worth highlighting.  This is because, for neoclassicals, produc-
tive factors were no longer simply understood as threefold—
through the division between land, labor, and capital—nor did 
they analytically correspond to different social groups.  Rather, 
they were more various and more fungible things that could just 
as well be the property of any individual in society.  Whoever was 
a factor’s owner, therefore, her household was free to sell that 
factor—based on the appropriate maximizing calculation at the 
 
60 Even the eighteenth-century French Physiocrats, who were a crucial influence 
on Smith, did not classify the spending of manufacturers as “sterile”—in their own 
threefold division between manufacturers, consumers, and landlords—only or mainly 
to venerate the spending of landlords as the opposite. Rather, by doing so they laid a 
policy basis for a “[s]ingle [t]ax” on the returns or rents of landed property in France. 
See HUDSON, supra note 31, at 48–49. In terms of policy focus, then, there was an even 
straighter line from the Physiocrats to the Ricardian Socialists in Britain and figures 
like Henry George—and even more so, the early institutionalist economists—in the 
United States than there was from Ricardo himself. See infra notes 71–73. 
61 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF 
NATIONS 161 (Harriman House 2007) (1776). 
62 See sources cited supra note 45. 
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margin—to firms, considered as the commanders of the now al-
together additional factor of entrepreneurship.  In turn, the profit 
that firms maximized under equilibrium was no more than a basic 
remuneration for the entrepreneurial labor or disutility—the line 
between these, too, now gone—of coordinating the creation of 
output from all the various factors the entrepreneur assembled 
together.63  Indeed, as the neoclassical tradition matured, by 1930 
interest more than profit had become the key category of revenue 
attributed to capital owners, with their entrepreneurial profit 
proper becoming merely a subcomponent of interest.64 
On the one hand, then, this modified idea of profit in neoclas-
sical consumer theory comprises a third important difference from 
the classical view.  On the other, it further explains how the first 
two differences—rooted in the distinctions that classical econo-
mists drew between market price and natural price and between 
production and exchange—were made to all but disappear in 
neoclassical theory.  That is, on the view formative to neoclas-
sicism, profit maximization in equilibrium did not prevent output 
from being sold at cost.65  To the contrary, like the factor of entre-
preneurship, so too did every other factor—whoever happened to 
be its owner—get paid a purchase price conceived as exactly 
matching the value of the marginal product it contributed to 
output.66  Here, one can further see how the direction of causality 
that the leading classical economists saw as holding between 
income distribution and prices—from the former to the latter—
was generally reversed in neoclassical theory.67 
 
63 See, e.g., CLARK, supra note 53. 
64 For Chicago school economists like Frank Knight—one of Milton Friedman’s 
mentors—profit thus represented the risk premium above the basic interest rate that 
could be earned on risk-free bonds. See MICHAEL HUDSON, THE BUBBLE AND BEYOND: 
FICTITIOUS CAPITAL, DEBT DEFLATION AND THE GLOBAL CRISIS 147–48 (2012). 
Knight’s idea built on a more basic distinction between risk and uncertainty. See 
FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT 19–20 (1921); see also infra note 
83 and accompanying text. 
65 CLARK, supra note 53, at 115. 
66 Clark’s description of his own purpose is instructive: 
[T]o show that the distribution of the income of society is controlled by a 
natural law, and that this law . . . would give to every agent of production 
the amount of wealth which that agent creates. . . . So far as it is not 
obstructed, it assigns to every one what he has specifically produced. 
Id. at v. 
67 See supra note 49. 
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4. Profit Versus Rent  
Together, the three differences recapitulated above imply a 
fourth as well.  Even more directly connected to the additional 
conception of property that is the focus of Section II.B, this differ-
ence involved the much greater—and even overriding—attention 
that classical thinkers gave to distinguishing profit from unearned 
economic rent.  Indeed, in Ricardo’s economics not only was the 
contrast paramount, but it also made rent a—and even the—
defining feature of the quintessential form of property held by 
Britain’s landed gentry.68  Of course, like those he influenced—
including John Stuart Mill—Ricardo did not fail to see that 
revenues garnished by landowners could, in principle, include both 
profit and economic rent.69  However, the important point was that 
the potential ambiguity between the two required vigilance.70 
B. The Identification of Rent with Land in Classical Economics 
For Ricardo, rent ultimately constituted a differential in the 
productive capacity of superior lands compared to those at the 
margin of cultivation; or, as he famously put it, rent was nothing 
other than “the produce obtained” from the same or different 
pieces of land “by the employment of two equal quantities of 
capital and labour” on it or them.71  In this respect, Ricardo as-
sumed an identity between rent and land, specifically landed 
property, in a way that was not uncommon for the classical 
economists.72  A half-century after his death in 1823, however, in 
the wake of the neoclassical revolution, this assumption would 
come in for two very different types of qualification. 
On the one hand, by the start of the twentieth century, there 
was a first qualification that broadly complemented a line of 
thought that initially began to emerge closer to Ricardo’s own day 
in Britain; in the 1830s and 1840s, that line of thought pushed 
Ricardo’s73 own thinking in the direction of advocating for a policy 
 
68 See RICARDO, supra note 46, at 87. 
69 See id. at 49–50. 
70 See ELTIS, supra note 31, at xlv–xlvi. 
71 RICARDO, supra note 46, at 57. 
72 Notwithstanding his disagreements about rent’s implications and laudability, 
Ricardo’s contemporary, the Reverend Thomas Malthus, shared this basic definition. 
See T.R. MALTHUS, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND PROGRESS OF RENT, AND THE 
PRINCIPLES BY WHICH IT IS REGULATED 1–2 (1815). 
73 While it is clear that Ricardo’s ideas influenced figures like Mill and certain of 
the so-called Ricardian socialists after his death, controversies remain about the 
extent to which Ricardo really directly influenced the latter group. See, e.g., J.E. King, 
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of taxing away the economic rent of landlords as an “unearned 
increment.”74  John Stuart Mill, who coined the latter phrase, was 
the most prominent example,75 and his mid-century extrapolation 
of Ricardo remained highly visible even at century’s end in places 
like the United States, especially through its influence on the 
journalist Henry George and his “single tax” on land movement.76  
Given George’s personal and political idiosyncrasy, however, as 
economist Michael Hudson notes, in the Progressive Era it was the 
early institutionalist or legal economists who most clearly picked 
up on and extended Ricardo’s way of linking rent to landed 
property, in particular.77 
While I will return to the institutionalists in Section II.C, for 
now it is enough to say that whereas they tended to expand the 
Ricardian concern with rent beyond land and thereby to sharpen 
its bite, neoclassical theory tended to do the opposite.  The second 
major qualification that Ricardo’s thought came in for, thus, 
involved questioning rather than extending his focus on land as 
rent’s exclusive source.  In pressing this point, neoclassical theory 
dispersed and dulled the force of classical rent theory.  What early 
neoclassical thinkers found lacking in Ricardo’s concern with the 
consequences of moving toward marginal land was his alleged 
 
Utopian or Scientific? A Reconsideration of the Ricardian Socialists, 15 HIST. POL. 
ECON. 345, 345 (1983). 
74 JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY WITH SOME OF THEIR 
APPLICATIONS TO SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 817–18 (W.J. Ashley ed., 1909) (1848). Ricardo 
himself never advocated any such policy. While an antagonist of the landed gentry, he 
was even more of a partisan of British manufacturers and financiers. His key policy 
aim was vindicated only after his death in the late 1840s when the grain import 
restrictions known as the Corn Laws were lifted. On Ricardo’s theory the Corn Laws 
meant domestic grain could only be procured through resort to increasingly marginal 
lands with a higher cost of production. In turn, increasing revenue was absorbed as a 
pure overhead of rent to landlords, which then cut into the profits of manufacture and, 
ultimately, economic growth. See RICARDO, supra note 46, at 373–78. 
75 MILL, supra note 74, at 818–19. As a transitional figure in the history of eco-
nomics, Mill offered ideas about taxation that were, in his own day, seen as premised 
on equalizing “sacrifice.” See, e.g., Edwin R.A. Seligman, Progressive Taxation in 
Theory and Practice, 9 AM. ECON. ASS’N Q. 563, 795 (1909). 
76 See HENRY GEORGE, PROGRESS AND POVERTY: AN INQUIRY INTO THE CAUSE OF 
INDUSTRIAL DEPRESSIONS, AND OF INCREASE OF WANT WITH INCREASE OF WEALTH 
389 (1879); see generally EDWARD T. O’DONNELL, HENRY GEORGE AND THE CRISIS OF 
INEQUALITY: PROGRESS AND POVERTY IN THE GILDED AGE (1st paperback ed. 2017) 
(presenting a contemporary study of George). 
77 See Michael Hudson, Henry George’s Political Critics, 67 AM. J. ECON. & SOCIO. 
1, 4–5 (2008) [hereinafter Hudson, Political Critics]; see also Michael Hudson, Veblen’s 
Institutionalist Elaboration of Rent Theory 7 (Levy Econ. Inst., Working Paper No. 
729, 2012) [hereinafter Hudson, Rent Theory], http://www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/ 
wp_729.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y7CS-LMC5]. 
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failure to see that it was only one instance of a larger principle of 
diminishing returns.78  That principle, they argued, was none 
other than the one the neoclassical revolutionaries had finally 
brought to light so as to put economics on a truly scientific 
foundation.79  To say that it was the marginal increment rather 
than total quantity of utility that mattered was thus to point to 
the diminishing returns of satiety resulting from consumption.  As 
mentioned earlier, it was only on this understanding of utility that 
a new theory of calculable or quantifiable economic value-as-
market price could eventually be erected.80 
Whereas Ricardo’s focus was on the higher cost of production 
at the margin of cultivation, his neoclassical qualifiers suggested 
that he should have really used the principle of diminishing re-
turns to ground an understanding of all economic activity in 
consumptive exchange.  As John Bates Clark put it best,  
[w]e have already gone far enough to get a view of one very 
general law.  So all-embracing, indeed, is it that it dominates 
economic life.  Classical studies afforded a glimpse of the working 
of it, within a very limited field, by their study of the so-called 
diminishing returns from agriculture. . . .  
Modern studies of value afford a glimpse of the action of this 
principle in a wholly different sphere.  They show that doses of 
consumers’ goods, given in a series to the same persons, have less 
and less utility per dose.  The final utility theory of value rests on 
the same principle as does the theory of diminishing returns from 
agriculture; and this principle has a far wider range of new 
applications.  One law, therefore, governs economic life, and 
theories old and new contain partial expressions of it. . . .  As this 
law may be traced in consumption, where the “final increment” 
of a particular article is less useful than earlier increments, so it 
is observable also in production, where the final increment of an 
industrial agent is less fruitful than earlier ones.  As value de-
pends on final utility, so shares in distribution depend on final 
productivity.81 
As for rent, on this view, it was not only abstracted away from 
land but away from the very idea that legalized control over land 
could serve as a constraint on production that allowed economic 
value to be siphoned off as the revenue of those granted entitle-
 
78 See CLARK, supra note 53, at 191–92. 
79 See, e.g., MIROWSKI, supra note 43, at 217–18; MARY S. MORGAN, THE WORLD 
IN THE MODEL: HOW ECONOMISTS WORK AND THINK 91–92 (2012). 
80 See supra note 47. 
81 CLARK, supra note 53, at 208. 
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ment to such legal constraint.  In the process, the basis for linking 
land, rent, and the right to property was also dissolved.  Read only 
as an insight concerning diminishing returns, Ricardo’s idea of 
landlord rent no longer illustrated how the right to property could 
impose overhead charges on future income from production.  
Rather, it now merely illustrated that all incomes were “differen-
tial gain[s]” in the same way as was land rent.82  In a passage 
indicating how the classical economists’ concept of a “surplus” was 
restricted even as the role of interest was expanded in neoclassical 
theory, Clark’s thoughts are again instructive: 
Ground rent we shall study as the earnings of one kind of 
capital-goods—as merely a part of interest.  We . . . see that 
wages and interest, though they are determined by the law of 
final productivity, are also capable of being measured exactly as 
ground rent has been measured.  That is to say, the Ricardian 
formula, which describes what is earned by a piece of land, may 
be used to describe what is earned by the whole fund of social 
capital: all interest may be made to take the form of a differential 
gain, or a surplus.83 
It should thus not be surprising that the most visible face of 
the idea of rent in law, economics, and political science today has 
become that which traces back to the term’s rechristening through 
Gordon Tullock and Anne Krueger’s notion of “rent-seeking” after 
1960.84  In its latter version however, the concept has borne only a 
superficial resemblance to the idea of property-as-rent in classical 
economics, not to mention the attempted extension of the concep-
tion of property-as-rent by the early institutionalists to non-landed 
forms of entitlement as well.  Further corroborating the point is 
how in public choice theory Tullock and Krueger’s idea of rent-
seeking has principally been used to evoke an image of public 
 
82 Id. at 191. 
83 Id. (footnote omitted) (“It is one of the most striking of economic facts that the 
income of all labor, on the one hand, and that of all capital, on the other, should be 
thus entirely akin to ground rent. They are the two generic rents, if by that term we 
mean differential products; and the earnings of land constitute a fraction of one of 
them.”); see also Conway L. Lackman, The Modern Development of Classical Rent 
Theory, 36 AM. J. ECON. & SOCIO. 51, 53 (1977). 
84 See Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft, 5 W. 
ECON. J. 224 (1967); Anne O. Krueger, The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking 
Society, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 291 (1974); see also Ronald Bird & Vincent J. Tarascio, 
Paretian Rent Theory Versus Pareto’s Rent Theory: A Clarification and Correction, in 
2 VILFREDO PARETO: CRITICAL ASSESSMENTS OF LEADING ECONOMISTS, VOLUME 2, 
473, 474 (John Cunningham Wood & Michael McLure eds., 1999) (discussing the 
(misnomer of) “ ‘Paretian’ rent[s]” in later neoclassical economic theory). 
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corruption born from the ability of political actors to use the state 
for their own enrichment.  Implying virtually the opposite of what 
the conception of property-as-rent did, the contemporary notion of 
rent-seeking thus largely abandons focus on the market’s in-built 
capacity to pervert economic well-being through the standing 
possibility for property entitlements to function as means of 
monopoly-like constraint.  In place of any conception of property-
as-rent, public choice theory’s view from rent seeking instead 
tends to insist on the absolute primacy of the market—and, hence, 
the right to property—as the only true means of guaranteeing 
private well-being.  On this view, rather than being an endemic 
feature of the market given its institutional basis in property, the 
seeking of rent becomes extrinsic to true economizing behavior.85 
C. From the Origins of Property-as-Rent to Early Legal 
Economism and the Present 
While Ricardo’s neoclassical qualifiers suggested that iden-
tifying rent specifically with landed property was a symptom of 
shortsightedness, historically speaking, the matter was not so 
simple.  The identity, in fact, hardly originated with Ricardo or 
even classical economics.  Rather, it began to emerge more than a 
century before the publication of Smith’s The Wealth of Nations in 
1776, as first property and then rent started to be abstracted as 
concepts within legal and economic discourse.86  If, as Bentham 
famously put it, “[p]roperty” was “born together” with “law,” equally 
can we then say that the concept we now know under its name—
that was grounded in control over land as its quintessential form—
entered into the world only in tandem with rent.87   
As historian Clive Holmes explains, it was thus really in the 
first two decades of the seventeenth century that the “notion of the 
right of property” started to be “transmuted” from a “narrow 
 
85 See Biplab Dasgupta, The New Political Economy: A Critical Analysis, 32 ECON. 
& POL. WKLY. PE13, PE13–PE14 (1997) (providing an insightful overview of the “new 
political economy” forged out of the idea of rent-seeking and public choice theory); see 
generally NANCY MACLEAN, DEMOCRACY IN CHAINS: THE DEEP HISTORY OF THE 
RADICAL RIGHT’S STEALTH PLAN FOR AMERICA (2017) (discussing Nobel Laureate 
James McGill Buchanan’s role in casting government as the principal source of “rents” 
and the public, in general, as those doing the seeking). 
86 See Clive Holmes, Parliament, Liberty, Taxation, and Property, in PARLIAMENT 
AND LIBERTY FROM THE REIGN OF ELIZABETH TO THE ENGLISH CIVIL WAR 122, 138 
(J.H. Hexter ed., 1992). 
87 JEREMY BENTHAM, PRINCIPLES OF THE CIVIL CODE (n.d.), reprinted in THEORY 
OF LEGISLATION 88, 113 (R. Hildreth trans., Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co. 
1908); see also supra note 74. 
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concept [within] the technical vocabulary of late medieval lawyers” 
into “an abstract right.”88  Especially pivotal in this process of 
“transmut[ation]” was the way that common law claims to land, in 
particular, were taken up into the right to property’s incipient 
abstraction.89  With rent, on the other hand, it took another few 
decades before its meaning began to rise out of the connotative web 
of ordinary English language.  Only then had the basis developed 
for the concept to diverge from its origins in thirteenth-century 
French financial usage where it specified a certain class of annui-
ties known as rente—as per an earlier technical meaning that 
obviously had already made its way into common law parlance 
well before the sixteenth century, as when stipulating the 
purchase price of land at so many years of rent.90 
As the political theorist David McNally shows, the key vehicle 
for advancing rent’s conceptual abstraction into a technical notion 
of economic rent was the proto-economic writing of Thomas Mun, 
an early director of the East India Company.  In 1628’s English 
Treasure by Foreign Trade, Mun developed a connection between 
the balance of trade—the oft-mentioned centerpiece of “mercantil-
ist” unsophistication—and the increasing price of farm commod-
ities.91  His central point was that the net “influx of specie”—with 
which mercantilist thinkers are often said to have been naively 
preoccupied—was important not as an end in itself but for its effect 
on increasing the total quantity of what Mun dubbed rent, 
specifically agricultural rent.92 
 
88 Holmes, supra note 86. 
89 See id. The details of the sequence Holmes describes cannot be recounted here 
in full. Overall, however, Holmes’ concern, which is with the “complex,” “intriguing” 
and ultimately historical “process” by which “a right to private property” was “insu-
lated”—through its abstraction—“from arbitrary royal intervention.” Id. Certainly, he 
is correct to challenge historically naive but common assumptions treating the right 
to property as just a fixture in the world rather than a concept with a history that 
emerged less than fully formed—whether through the Magna Carta or some even 
earlier tradition of primordial Saxon liberty. 
90 As the historian Niall Ferguson explains, rente annuities arose from the prob-
lem city-states faced in financing deficits without Church censure in the thirteenth 
century. While prohibiting interest, usury laws did not apply to medieval census deals, 
which enabled one party to purchase an annual payment stream from another. Just 
as these purchased payment streams took shape in the form of rentes heritables in 
Northern French towns, in Flemish ones they became the basis for the erfelikrenten. 
See NIALL FERGUSON, THE ASCENT OF MONEY: A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE WORLD 
73–74 (2008). 
91 DAVID MCNALLY, POLITICAL ECONOMY AND THE RISE OF CAPITALISM: A REIN-
TERPRETATION 31–32 (1988). 
92 Id. 
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More than Mun, however, it was his more famous inheritor, 
William Petty, who fastened the still newly abstracted concept of 
rent to the only slightly less new conceptual abstraction of the 
right to property, including in land.  In 1662’s Treatise of Taxes 
and Contributions, Petty effectively launched the proposition that 
the defining feature of land under the right to property was its 
ability to yield rent.  Although in Petty’s usage rent here was a 
stand-in for the soil’s surplus output, once costs of production were 
subtracted,93 the nominally same identity was maintained by 
those who would go on to coin and then refine the famed “[t]rinity 
[f]ormula”94 of classical economics as it passed from the French 
Physiocrats, to Adam Smith to Ricardo.95  While the ongoing modi-
fication of the formula eventually saw its first two elements—of 
the profits of stock and the wages of labor—further differentiated, 
the third element of the rent of land held constant as a metonymic 
stand-in for the special return appropriated by the owners of land.   
Even exiting our brief historical excursus here, two points 
become clear.  First, in further contrast to the neoclassical recep-
tion of Ricardo, there is good reason to see the focus on land as a 
source of rent that long predated him as being of central rather 
than incidental importance.  Central, that is, because the focus on 
land as the source of rent implicitly buttressed an economic 
conception of the right to property that was distinct from any 
reduction of it, instead, to a means of preference satisfaction;96 and 
more than incidental because the long-standing identity between 
landed property and rent which Ricardo observed was not 
important simply, or even mainly, because it illustrated the larger 
principle of diminishing returns at work. 
 
93 See WILLIAM PETTY, A TREATISE OF TAXES AND CONTRIBUTIONS (1662), 
reprinted in 1 THE ECONOMIC WRITINGS OF SIR WILLIAM PETTY 1, 43 (Charles Henry 
Hull ed., Augustus M. Kelly 1963), quoted in MCNALLY, supra note 91, at 50. 
94 See 3 KARL MARX, CAPITAL: A CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 953–56, 958, 
961, 965 (David Fernbach trans., Penguin Books 1991) (1894). 
95 See HUDSON, supra note 31, at 60–64. 
96 It is also worth noting that property-as-rent was distinct from an economic 
conception focused on wealth generation through inducing individuals to labor or 
invest, as the view from neoclassical consumer theory might be restated if one wanted 
to insist on locating its origins before 1870—whether through Bentham or Smith’s 
work or even John Locke’s so-called labor theory of property. See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, 
Property as the Keystone Right?, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 329, 330 (1996). As to 
whether Bentham’s utilitarianism—let alone the non-utility-based thought of Smith 
or Locke—can really be seen as a version of neoclassical consumer theory in germ 
form, as noted earlier, there are ample reasons for doubt. See supra text accompanying 
note 47. 
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Second, the above excursus into the deeper history of identity 
between rent and the entitlement to land requires that we rethink 
the widely held idea that property started to be de-physicalized 
only upon being uncoupled from land and linked, instead, to in-
tangible “exchange-value” as industrialization matured.97  Espe-
cially in a United States that was long rendered land-rich98—
through a process of dispossessing Native Americans that was, 
itself, still ongoing during the period of breakneck industrial 
expansion99—property’s de-physicalization is often said to have 
begun only in the age of laissez faire constitutionalism.  Indeed, 
this point often goes hand in hand with the further lament that 
because the right to property’s economic conception is exhausted 
by the notion of preference-satisfying individualism, its distinct 
social and communitarian aspect gets short shrift.100   
As Part II has sought to clarify, however, the standard story 
about the rise of “property in value” is incomplete and even 
misleading.  Already long before the first industrial revolution—
let alone the second101—there was a thoroughly de-physicalized 
vision of property that inhered in the idea that entitlement to land 
mattered precisely because it allowed its holder to appropriate a 
uniquely unearned stream of payment.102  In this respect, rather 
than a misapprehension or case of tunnel vision, focusing on land 
as rent’s source added a further—and, in ways, the very first—
basis on which property became a “keystone right,” to borrow a 
phrase from Carol Rose.103 
 
97 See COMMONS, supra note 35, at 18–19; Weidenbaum & Jensen, supra note 35. 
98 See HOVENKAMP, THE OPENING OF AMERICAN LAW, supra note 30, at 78; see 
also HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, 1836–1937, at 70–71 
(1991). 
99 See generally A.M. SAKOLSKI, THE GREAT AMERICAN LAND BUBBLE (1932); 
RICHARD SLOTKIN, THE FATAL ENVIRONMENT: THE MYTH OF THE FRONTIER IN THE 
AGE OF INDUSTRIALIZATION, 1800–1890 (1985); JANET A. MCDONNELL, THE DIS-
POSSESSION OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN, 1887–1934 (1991). 
100 See, e.g., ALEXANDER, supra note 21, at 259–61, 325–29; Alexander, et. al., 
supra note 1, at 743–44. 
101 See C.A. BAYLY, THE BIRTH OF THE MODERN WORLD, 1780–1914, at 49–52, 
110–12 (2004) (discussing the distinction). 
102 Here I am leaving aside the other earlier germ of de-physicalization. Already 
in the early nineteenth-century United States, this involved an accumulation of 
various legal exceptions to exclusively tangible property—as in business goodwill and 
accession—and, in turn, their role in helping to abstract property into a more general 
principle of judicial reasoning about rights. See Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The New 
Property of the Nineteenth Century: The Development of the Modern Concept of 
Property, 29 BUFF. L. REV. 325, 333–35 (1980). 
103 Rose, supra note 96, at 329–30, 333. 
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Indeed, the conception of property-as-rent did not simply go 
into abeyance after neoclassical thinkers charged Ricardo with 
failing to appreciate that he had really just discovered one 
instance of a larger principle of diminishing returns that could be 
applied much more generally to economics.  As I touched on earlier 
in Section II.B, the legal or institutionalist economists of the 
Progressive Era in the United States were also keepers of the idea 
of property-as-rent, a feature of their enterprise that has been far 
too little appreciated.104  In their case, however, by trying to push 
beyond rent’s strict identification with landed property alone they 
were pushing in a very different direction from their early 
neoclassical counterparts.  Likewise, the limitation in Ricardo’s 
thought that they sought to overcome was not about his alleged 
failure to see the true scope of the principle of diminishing returns.  
To the contrary, it was about overcoming his failure to treat money 
and debt as anything more than a neutral force that could be 
presumed to “affect[ ] commodity prices, wages, and other incomes 
symmetrically.”105  Still the dominant view today on such an 
understanding is that money always goes to payment for goods 
and services and never, say, to bidding up the value of real estate 
and financial assets or to eliciting an ever-expanding array of new 
debt-based property forms.  That money could also be a political 
institution, a form of social power, a withdrawn hoard, and so on, 
was simply out of the question for Ricardo; and so too did it then 
remain in Alfred Marshall’s canonical textbook of the early 
neoclassical tradition; as so too it still largely remains in the 
present.106 
 
104 See sources cited supra note 31; Hudson, Rent Theory, supra note 77, at 7; 
Hudson, Political Critics, supra note 77, at 2–5. 
105 Dirk Bezemer & Michael Hudson, Finance Is Not the Economy: Reviving the 
Conceptual Distinction, 50 J. ECON. ISSUES 745, 748 (2016). 
106 See 1 ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 79 (1890). At least in the 
English-speaking world, Marshall’s text remained the standard until Paul 
Samuelson’s in the second half of the twentieth century. See PAUL A. SAMUELSON, 
FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1947). While picked up from Ricardo, the idea 
of money’s “neutrality” or its role as a mere “veil” also traced back before him to earlier 
versions of the quantity theory of money that was its underpinning. See Don Patinkin 
& Otto Steiger, Note, In Search of the “Veil of Money” and the “Neutrality of Money”: 
A Note on the Origin of Terms, 91 SCANDINAVIAN J. ECON. 131, 138, 141 (1989) (setting 
forth the history of the “veil”or “neutrality” label, which Marshall did not himself use 
directly but which was used to describe him and his followers in the 1930s by the later 
British economist, John Hicks). Most prominently, there was David Hume’s version 
of the latter from the 1750s. Id. at 131. In its modern incarnation in orthodox 
monetary economics, the quantity theory of money asserts a direct proportionality 
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Beyond his theory of comparative advantage, Ricardo’s ad-
herence to money’s neutrality was the other key legacy of his 
thought that survived the neoclassical revolution.  Just as it did 
for Ricardo himself, the view of money’s neutrality would go on to 
enable his neoclassical inheritors in further excluding the pos-
sibility that interest-bearing bank credit, in its then still limited 
array of legal forms, might too be a means of taking proprietorship 
over unearned rent.107  In fact, as noted earlier, neoclassical 
thinkers generally sought to demonstrate the opposite, instead 
transforming interest into the ordinary return of capital owners 
with profit, itself, being transformed into just one subspecies of 
interest.108  Not surprisingly, for their own part, the early legal or 
institutionalist economists tended to challenge this way of embrac-
ing the seeming regression in Ricardo’s thought as compared to 
Adam Smith’s where the question of interest was concerned, 
although their objections quickly receded from within attention of 
most neoclassical thinkers.109  Within the conversation that did 
remain audible to those in the neoclassical milieu, it would be John 
Maynard Keynes who would most clearly articulate some 
noticeable version of the same objection.110 
Through their altogether different way of pushing past the 
Ricardian inheritance, it was thus the institutionalists who made 
the idea of property-as-rent more acute.  In so doing, they es-
chewed simply remapping the concept onto a generalized notion of 
differential gain in the way neoclassical thinkers were intent on 
doing, to the ultimate effect of making labor and capital incomes, 
themselves, no more than “generic rents” as John Bates Clark put 
it.111  While here is not the place to go into further detail about 
Clark’s line of thought, understanding the competing ways in 
 
between the general price level of goods and services and the amount of money in 
circulation. Id. 
107 See Bezemer & Hudson, supra note 105, at 748. 
108 See HUDSON, supra note 64, at 38–39. 
109 See id. at 39 (discussing Smith’s much less sanguine view of interest-bearing 
debt and its continuity with a much longer previous history of the same). 
110 Picking up on his earlier work, in his best-known book Keynes described 
interest as a “rentier” return, and rentiers, themselves, as “functionless investor[s]” 
akin to the Ricardian landlord. See, JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY 
OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST, AND MONEY (1936), reprinted in 7 THE COLLECTED WRIT-
INGS OF JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES 1, 376 (4th ed. 2013) (“Interest to-day rewards no 
genuine sacrifice, any more than does the rent of land. The owner of capital can obtain 
interest because capital is scarce, just as the owner of land can obtain rent because 
land is scarce.”). See HUDSON, supra note 64, at 150–53 (considering how Keynes 
diminished his own earlier ideas in The General Theory). 
111 CLARK, supra note 53, at 191; see also supra note 83 (containing the full quote). 
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which the neoclassical and institutional economists handled 
Ricardo’s legacy does make it easier to understand various aspects 
of institutionalist thought.  Doing so, for example, clarifies the 
concerns that the greatest of the American institutionalists, 
Thorstein Veblen, was trying to address in 1923’s Absentee Owner-
ship.  Likewise, it puts the lesser known but well-respected Edwin 
Seligman’s abandonment of “sacrifice theory” as a basis for 
progressive taxation into new perspective, while also helping to 
explain why he instead endorsed what he called “the point of view 
of production” as the most realistic perspective from which to 
properly account for the “advantage[s]” that “possess[ors]” of 
producing “facult[ies]” were able to leverage toward the end of so 
effortlessly increasing their respective “possessions.”112  Much the 
same goes for the famed John R. Commons’ thesis that the key 
shift that the United States’ economy had undergone involved a 
transition from an age of “exclusive holding for self” to one 
premised on a power of creating scarcities by “withholding from 
others.”113  Finally, understanding the early American legal or 
institutional economists as individuals attempting to extend 
Ricardo’s view of rent beyond land as its exclusive source also 
makes more intelligible even the more slogan-like pronounce-
ments of the famed realist Judge Jerome Frank—equating 
property with monopoly, for example.114 
 
112 EDWIN R.A. SELIGMAN, THE INCOME TAX: A STUDY OF THE HISTORY, THEORY, 
AND PRACTICE OF INCOME TAXATION AT HOME AND ABROAD 32 (2d ed. 1914); 
Seligman, supra note 75, at 289, 291. Seligman’s abandonment of the “sacrifice theory” 
had to do with what Hovenkamp describes as the larger antagonism to progressive 
marginalism’s key premise by the 1930s. See Hovenkamp, The First Great Law & 
Economics Movement, supra note 30, at 1033–37. By then, neoclassical welfare theory 
was arguing the strictly “positivist” position that determinate judgments could not be 
drawn about whether a wealthy person valued her marginal dollar less than a poor 
person. Id. at 1039, 1041–45. The “positivist” view thus said that interpersonal 
comparisons about even marginal satieties were impossible because they could only 
be known “ordinal[ly].” Id. at 1035. See also supra note 47. 
113 COMMONS, supra note 35, at 53 (first emphasis added); John R. Commons, Law 
and Economics, 34 YALE L.J. 371, 380 (1925) (“Now it is the engineer, the technologist, 
the labor manager, the laborer, who increases the efficiency values by enlarging 
output, but it is the business man, or rather the business function of all men, which 
maintains or increases the scarcity values by withholding output. The technologist is 
a specialist in efficiency, the business man a specialist in scarcity.”). 
114 Standard Brands, Inc. v. Smidler, 151 F.2d 34, 38–39 (2d. Cir. 1945) (Frank, 
J., concurring), quoted in HOVENKAMP, THE OPENING OF AMERICAN LAW, supra note 
30, at 199; see generally ROBERT JEROME GLENNON, THE ICONOCLAST AS REFORMER: 
JEROME FRANK’S IMPACT ON AMERICAN LAW (1985) (discussing Frank’s broader 
intellectual formation). 
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With all this said, however, it would still be a mistake to 
imagine that the importance of recovering the conception of 
property-as-rent—which land, in all its irreducible tangibility, 
underpinned—is to be found mainly on theoretical or historical 
grounds.  To the contrary, by clarifying the continuity between 
“the first [great] law [and] economics movement” in the United 
States as pioneered by institutionalists like Veblen and Com-
mons115 and the concerns that started to be articulated well over 
two centuries before in the work of proto-economic thinkers like 
Mun and that continued to be perfected during the nineteenth 
century by thinkers like Ricardo, we also stand to gain better 
purchase on our own era.  With its ever-proliferating forms of 
entitlement over debt-based financial assets, this is especially the 
case given how little our resurgent debate pitting the object-
centered and progressive models of property against one another 
has been able to illuminate the present era.  As for why it should 
be a priority for property scholars to try to gain better purchase on 
the present, on one level it is because debt-based financial asset 
claims are, in one way or another, ownership claims on future 
incomes from production.  On another level, it is because of the 
even more striking fact that even today such claims remain, in no 
small part, ultimately staked on revenues derived from land’s 
scarcity value. 
Of course, here land must not simply be understood as coequal 
with real estate, a term that in the predominant market and 
accounting practice conflates the cost of built structures with the 
undifferentiated site prices of land proper.  Ironically, then, to 
better understand our contemporary world by reaching around 
property’s competing conceptions as commodity versus propriety 
and instead reaching toward its neglected conception as rent, we 
need not even be so rigorous as to pick up from where the legal and 
institutional economists of the Progressive Era left off.  Instead, 
given how dependent our economy continues to be on scarcity 
premiums derived from land, we only really need to pick up from 
where the classical economist predecessors of the institutionalists 
left off.  In other words, relaxing the identity between rent and 
landed property is, in a sense, beside the point when it comes to 
reckoning with the proliferation of debt-based financial asset 
claims on real estate value in the new “Gilded Age” of the present. 
 
115 See Hovenkamp, The First Great Law & Economics Movement, supra note 30, 
at 993. 
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As I will eventually show in Part IV of this Article, this is 
borne out by the fact surrounding the great acceleration of housing 
price increases in the United States economy since the mid-1970s, 
which has seen the value of land increasing far more rapidly than 
that of built structures.  As a result, land’s site price drives an 
ever-increasing share of housing price values in the real estate 
market.  Inclusive of the varying scarcity of public goods that arise 
through differential government investment in the vicinities sur-
rounding housing sites and exclusive of the value of new housing 
structures on sites that arise through private real estate 
entrepreneurialism, even today in the twenty-first century, the 
land’s price remains a wellspring for the extraction of economic 
rent.  Surely, then, it is no accident that financial forms devoted 
to taking proprietorship over land rent also continue to multiply. 
III.  CONTEXTUALIZING THE RISE OF FINANCIAL ASSET PROPERTY 
I will return to the question of the land’s rising site value and 
the new form of securitized property-in-rent it has permitted in 
the wake of the mortgage crisis–cum–Great Recession and what 
can be  thought of as a long-gestating sequel, the ongoing economic 
turmoil touched off by the Coronavirus shock.  Before doing so, 
however, Part III bridges Parts I, II, and IV by first discussing the 
larger context for understanding the more general rise of debt-
based financial asset property in the United States since the 
1970s.  Part III emphasizes three elements of the last forty to fifty 
years of context in particular: (1) the growth of inequality in 
wealth and income; (2) the rise of debt, real estate securitization, 
and the FIRE sector; and (3) the phenomenon of financial asset-
price inflation. 
A. Reckoning with the Growth of Inequality 
Already well before the rise of right-wing ultranationalism 
and the renewed economic crisis touched off by the Coronavirus 
pandemic, in the wake of  the bursting of the last housing bubble 
and the ensuing Great Recession, it had grown thoroughly un-
tenable to keep ignoring the way inequality116—in both income 
 
116 Unless otherwise stated, this Section focuses on inequality within the United 
States, not inequality within the globe’s other nations, global inequality between 
nations, or inequality across the globe’s entire population taken as individuals—the 
latter two are particularly affected by the outsized importance of goings-on in India 
and China. See generally BRANKO MILANOVIC, GLOBAL INEQUALITY: A NEW AP-
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and, more importantly, wealth—had become a major economic 
problem and even a social emergency in the United States.117  Of 
course, on both fronts the problem has been severely magnified 
across racial lines.118  Moreover, as is equally clear, it is also no 
longer plausible—if it ever was—to continue trying to explain 
away the growth of inequality as a function of “a rising tide lifting 
all boats,” despite the lingering ubiquity of such a sentiment.  Even 
putting aside how income and wealth polarization is deleterious in 
itself, the rising tide metaphor is misplaced.  While its logic might 
capture a dynamic that was still at play when John F. Kennedy 
popularized the phrase in the 1960s, it simply fails to capture 
present trends.  At the risk of stretching the metaphor, more 
accurate would be to say that there have been rising yachts and a 
vast majority of lesser vessels left either rudderless or sinking, not 
to mention the large number of former passengers who have been 
thrown overboard.119   
 
PROACH FOR THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION (2016) (presenting an overview of trends in 
these different types of inequality). 
117 See Edward N. Wolff, The Asset Price Meltdown, Rising Leverage, and the 
Wealth of the Middle Class, 47 J. ECON. ISSUES 333, 336–37, 340–41 (2013) (discussing 
how inequality in income and wealth has fared after the Great Recession); see also 
Landy, supra note 38 (comparing wealth inequality trends before 2007). 
118 DALTON CONLEY, BEING BLACK, LIVING IN THE RED: RACE, WEALTH, AND 
SOCIAL POLICY IN AMERICA 5 (10th anniversary ed., 2010); Carlos Gradin, Race and 
Income Distribution: Evidence from the USA, Brazil and South Africa, 18 REV. DEV. 
ECON. 73, 75 (2014); THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, TOXIC INEQUALITY: HOW AMERICA’S 
WEALTH GAP DESTROYS MOBILITY, DEEPENS THE RACIAL DIVIDE, AND THREATENS 
OUR FUTURE 14–17 (2017). 
119 It is obviously not possible to recount comprehensively how debate on domestic 
inequality has evolved. In brief, however, especially through the 1990s, when these 
questions were much less visible, versions of the “rising tide lifts all boats” argument 
were vigorously advanced as ostensible correctives to those calling for greater 
recognition of inequality as a problem. In effect, the corrective asserted that the real 
issue was not inequality but poverty. See, e.g., Martin Feldstein, Income Inequality 
and Poverty 1–4 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 6770, 1998), 
https://www.nber.org/papers/w6770.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZS4K-F6AX]. Such claims 
were often further accompanied by the idea that more concerted efforts to combat 
inequality through the tax and transfer system would sap economic growth and 
actually submerge the lower boats that were often simultaneously suggested to be 
rising. See, e.g., Robert E. Lucas Jr., The Industrial Revolution: Past and Future, 
REGION, May 2004, at 4, 7, 20. Claims about the growth-inhibiting effect of 
redistribution thus gave rise to a further layer of debate. Likewise, the same happened 
with the equally recurrent claims questioning wage inequality’s importance by 
suggesting that it was simply due to a skills gap favoring workers with information 
technology competence, as per so-called skill-biased technological change theories. 
Skipping over the details, by the present time, research has more and more forcefully 
reinstated and expanded on the original reason there seemed to be for alarm—rooted, 
as it was, in issues of class power, the bipartisan drift to tax policy favoring the 
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Even so, discussion of inequality has too easily been able to 
remain opaque, not only with respect to the question of periodiza-
tion but also causation.  Of these two aspects, the first is the easier 
to clarify, notwithstanding the persistence of the idea—especially 
in partisan discussion—that intensified inequality is a phenome-
non of the first decade of the new millennium, whether in the lead-
up to the Great Recession during the Bush years or after 2008 
during the Obama years.  In reality, the growing polarization of 
income and wealth in the United States—and, indeed, much of the 
world—has witnessed a sharpening separation of the top ten and, 
in reality, the top one and even top one-tenth of one percent of the 
population from those below since the mid-1970s.120 
Furthermore, it must be noted that even though the ascent of 
inequality was given little spotlight before 2011, a clear effort to 
document the problem was already under way fifteen to twenty 
years earlier.  Indeed, a disturbing picture had already emerged 
not only prior to the so-called sub-prime crisis of 2007, but even 
before the bursting of the dot-com bubble in 2001.  Its quantitative 
dimension was filled in by select economists, sociologists, and 
 
wealthy, and so on. See Lawrence Mishel, Heidi Shierholz & John Schmitt, Don’t 
Blame the Robots: Assessing the Job Polarization Explanation of Growing Wage 
Inequality 4, 7, 35–36 (Nov. 19, 2013) (unpublished working paper), https://files.epi. 
org/2013/technology-inequality-dont-blame-the-robots.pdf [https://perma.cc/CJE4-2SBB] 
(considering the current status of the skill-biased technological change argument). 
With respect to arguments about inequality and growth, an opposite perspective now 
seems to hold. That is, rather than correcting inequality through redistribution as a 
way of sapping growth, it is the increasing separation of the top segments of the in-
come and wealth distribution from the sinking or static rest that is now feared as a 
major hindrance of growth—to say nothing of well-being in a broader sense. See, e.g., 
Roy van der Weide & Branko Milanovic, Inequality Is Bad for Growth of the Poor (But 
Not for That of the Rich), 32 WORLD BANK ECON. REV. 507, 508, 516, 525 (2018); 
Emmanuel Saez, Striking It Richer: The Evolution of Top Incomes in the United 
States, 1, 7 (Feb. 2020) (unpublished note), https://eml.berkeley.edu/~saez/saez-
UStopincomes-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/7GNY-HKWM]. Regarding the absolutely 
deleterious nature of inequality in and of itself, within the extensive literature, see 
generally RICHARD WILKINSON & KATE PICKETT, THE SPIRIT LEVEL: WHY GREATER 
EQUALITY MAKES SOCIETIES STRONGER (2011); RICHARD WILKINSON & KATE 
PICKETT, THE INNER LEVEL: HOW MORE EQUAL SOCIETIES REDUCE STRESS, RESTORE 
SANITY AND IMPROVE EVERYONE’S WELL-BEING (2019). 
120 See supra notes 118–119; see also PIKETTY, supra note 36, at 388–90; Thomas 
Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, Inequality in the Long Run, 344 SCIENCE 838, 838–43 
(2014); Thomas Piketty, Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel Zucman, Distributional National 
Accounts: Methods and Estimates for the United States, 133 Q.J. ECON. 553, 577–81 
(2018); RICHARD V. REEVES, DREAM HOARDERS: HOW THE AMERICAN UPPER MIDDLE 
CLASS IS LEAVING EVERYONE ELSE IN THE DUST, WHY THAT IS A PROBLEM, AND WHAT 
TO DO ABOUT IT 6 (2017) (setting forth a recent perspective that looks at impacts on 
broader well-being). 
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others who were assembling relevant data during the much-
celebrated prosperity of the Clinton years.121  The qualitative 
aspect of the picture was colored in by various others, including 
journalists and advocates, among whom it was becoming common 
to speak of the emergence of a new “working poor.”122  Already by 
the turn of the millennium the overall portrait was sharply at odds 
with the default image of generalized middle-class prosperity.  By 
the mid-1990s, this prosperity still had an air of timelessness, 
although its roots really went back only so far as the gains that 
workers in the United States had achieved in the quarter century 
between 1945 and 1970 or 1975.123  As concerning the periodization 
of mounting inequality, therefore, it should not be doubted that it 
substantially predates the Great Recession and even the advent of 
post–Cold War globalization.   
As for the matter of causation, it is, admittedly, more complex.  
One benefit of the earlier discussion building outside of the spot-
light in the 1990s is that it was taking place at a time that made 
it easier to avoid simplistic explanations based solely on globaliza-
tion, which was then not only still a new phenomenon but also a 
new idea.  This earlier state of affairs can profitably be compared 
to the discussion that became prevalent after the 2016 presidential 
election, which made it ever more common to reflexively equate 
inequality with globalization.  The dissolution of working-class, 
and even middle-class, life in the United States is thus now ubiqui-
tously attributed to a decline of the manufacturing sector due to 
the rise of the developing world and, especially, China.  (Here, 
“China” stands ambiguously both for the People’s Republic of 
China after its opening in the 1970s and the more general 
liberalization of supply chains and trade and investment flow into 
which China has figured so prominently since the end of the Cold 
War.)  Such explanations are partly appealing, no doubt, because 
they dovetail with both liberal and conservative party political 
 
121 See Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, Income Inequality in the United States, 
1913–1998, 118 Q.J. ECON. 1, 4–5, 7, 11 (2003); JAMES K. GALBRAITH, CREATED 
UNEQUAL: THE CRISIS IN AMERICAN PAY 133–34 (1998). 
122 Catherine S. Chilman, Working Poor Families: Trends, Causes, Effects, and 
Suggested Policies, 40 FAM. RELS. 191, 191–92 (1991); Sheldon Danziger & Peter 
Gottschalk, Hardly Making It: The Increase in Low Earnings and What To Do About 
It, in AMERICA’S WORKING POOR 69, 70 (Thomas R. Swartz & Kathleen Maas Weigert 
eds., 1995); BARBARA EHRENREICH, NICKEL AND DIMED: ON (NOT) GETTING BY IN 
AMERICA 59 (2001). 
123 See BRENNER, supra note 8, at 43–45. It is this roughly quarter century that 
historians dub the so-called golden age of capitalism, not without a reason. 
402 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:363   
ideology in the United States.  That is, as a sound bite, the rise-of-
China narrative can be invoked from the right to allege that we 
are being exploited by some them that is taking our jobs, with them 
being flexible enough to comprise people in China, specifically, the 
developing world more generally, or their “globalist” allies at 
home.  Meanwhile, on the liberal end of the party political spec-
trum, the rise-of-China narrative provides a way to lament the 
plight of the American worker while still concluding, overall, that 
globalization should be vindicated as the presumptive agency be-
hind bringing hundreds of millions, if not billions, out of poverty, 
in accord with our unquestionable commitment to a better 
international order.124 
Side by side with the rise-of-China explanation for inequality, 
in recent years another has been emerging as well, albeit one that 
seems to appeal primarily to those on the liberal—or liberalizing—
end of the spectrum.  On this view, the decline of working and even 
middle-class life is attributed to job losses from technological 
automation—more than offshoring, free trade, or people in the 
developing world taking what is ours.  Certainly, the explanation 
from automation cannot simply be disregarded.125  However, it is 
clearly oversimplifying to the extent that its basis in the available 
evidence is far outstripped by the media frenzy concerning artifi-
 
124 Clearly, the questions of if, how, and why global poverty has been changing are 
complex. To the extent that poverty can be said to be decreasing, the cause cannot be 
accounted for in as reductive a way as it often is when citing to vaguely defined notions 
of “globalization” or “liberalization.” This, moreover, is to put aside the outsized effect 
on the data of China—with what, after all, has remained its state-run economy—and 
to a lesser extent, India. See, e.g., Amartya Sen, Indian Development: Lessons and 
Non-Lessons, DAEDALUS, Fall 1989, at 369, 370, 372; Y.Y. Kueh, Mao and Agriculture 
in China’s Industrialization: Three Antitheses in a 50-Year Perspective, 187 CHINA Q. 
700, 701 (2006); Angus Deaton, Price Indexes, Inequality, and the Measurement of 
World Poverty, 100 AM. ECON. REV. 5, 31–32 (2010); Sanjay Reddy & Rahul Lahoti, 
$1.90 a Day: What Does It Say? The New International Poverty Line, 97 NEW LEFT 
REV. 106, 118–19 (2016); Martin Kirk & Jason Hickel, Gates Foundation’s Rose-
Colored World View Not Supported by Evidence, HUMANOSPHERE (Mar. 20, 2017), 
http://www.humanosphere.org/opinion/2017/03/gates-foundations-rose-colored-world-
view-not-supported-by-evidence/ [https://perma.cc/5D9R-BVZR]; see generally JASON 
HICKEL, THE DIVIDE: A BRIEF GUIDE TO GLOBAL INEQUALITY AND ITS SOLUTIONS 
(2017). 
125 See, e.g., Daron Acemoglu et al., Import Competition and the Great U.S. 
Employment Sag of the 2000s, 34 J. Lab. Econ. S141, S163 (2016); David H. Autor, 
David Dorn & Gordon H. Hanson, Untangling Trade and Technology: Evidence from 
Local Labour Markets, 125 ECON. J. 621, 624, 626, 643–44 (2015); Allan Collard-
Wexler & Jan De Loecker, Reallocation and Technology: Evidence from the U.S. Steel 
Industry, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 131, 132 (2015). 
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cially intelligent robot futures it plays into.126  Indeed, the fervor 
with which such explanations have been embraced in the United 
States since the 2016 presidential election is reminiscent of the 
way that talk of skill-biased technological change proliferated in 
the early 2000s and, in the process, was erroneously used to 
explain away increasing income inequality as nothing more than 
the product of varying information technology competence among 
different segments of the labor force.127 
 
126 The snowballing pace of coverage around the 2016 presidential election in the 
United States often drew on the same hardly novel handful of studies as evidence. 
See, e.g., Claire Cain Miller, As Robots Grow Smarter, American Workers Struggle To 
Keep Up, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 15, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/16/upshot/as-
robots-grow-smarter-american-workers-struggle-to-keep-up.html [https://perma.cc/23A2-
NXJS]; Steve Denning, Do Trade Agreements Kill Jobs?, FORBES (Mar. 8, 2016, 3:39 
PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/stevedenning/2016/03/08/should-we-blame-trade-
agreements-for-loss-of-jobs/ [https://perma.cc/E957-4BDF]; Allison Burke, What Is the 
Future of Free Trade? 5 Facts About U.S. Trade Policy, BROOKINGS NOW (Nov. 18, 
2016), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/brookings-now/2016/11/18/what-is-the-future-of-
free-trade-5-facts-about-us-trade-policy/ [https://perma.cc/7TKL-JBCA]; Claire Cain 
Miller, The Long-Term Jobs Killer Is Not China. It’s Automation, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 21, 
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/21/upshot/the-long-term-jobs-killer-is-not-
china-its-automation.html [https://perma.cc/S7CE-TWDY]. But see Adams Nager, 
Trade vs. Productivity: What Caused U.S. Manufacturing’s Decline and How To Revive 
It, INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND. 1–2 (Feb. 2017), http://www2.itif.org/2017-
trade-vs-productivity.pdf [https://perma.cc/D7VZ-YZL9] (rebuking media simplifi-
cation). 
127 See Mishel, Shierholz & Schmitt, supra note 119, at 4–7 (considering the cur-
rent status of such theories); see generally Aaron Benanav, Automation and the Future 
of Work (pt. 1), 119 NEW LEFT REV. 5 (2019), https://newleftreview.org/issues/ii119/ 
articles/aaron-benanav-automation-and-the-future-of-work-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
62VC-NQLK]; Aaron Benanav, Automation and the Future of Work (pt. 2), 120 NEW 
LEFT REV. 117 (2019), https://newleftreview.org/issues/ii120/articles/aaron-benanav-
automation-and-the-future-of-work-2 [https://perma.cc/4WAS-HYC9]. This, of course, 
is not to say that the “robots” argument is the same—or supported to the same 
extent—for all forms of automation. It is only to say that media frenzy around such 
themes, as much as the empirical determinacy of the data, is what drives 
oversimplification. Cf. DOUG HENWOOD, AFTER THE NEW ECONOMY (2005) (present-
ing a study of the frenzy of the early 2000s around the supposed imminence of work’s 
transformation by new technologies). Within the technical economic literature, the 
leading exponent of the skills-biased technological change focus as the source of 
growing inequality is, perhaps, David Autor. See, e.g., David H. Autor, Lawrence F. 
Katz, Melissa S. Kearney, Trends in U.S. Wage Inequality: Revising the Revisionists, 
90 REV. ECON. & STAT. 300 (2008); David H. Autor, Skills, Education, and the Rise of 
Earnings Inequality Among the “Other 99 Percent,” 344 SCIENCE 843 (2014). For a 
discussion of countervailing evidence from other recent technical work see Kate Bahn, 
Education Won’t Solve Inequality, SLATE (May 30, 2018, 10:00 AM), https://slate.com/ 
human-interest/2018/05/study-unions-increasingly-represent-educated-workers.html 
[https://perma.cc/Q45S-N9CE] (citing Henry S. Farber et al., Unions and Inequality 
over the Twentieth Century: New Evidence from Survey Data (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Rsch., Working Paper No. 24587, 2018)). 
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Discussion of the timing and antecedents of our present era 
would thus better begin from facts that started emerging already 
from the mid-1970s.  Among the most prominent of such facts are 
the stagnation of real wages for all but the top ten to twenty 
percent of the workforce by the end of that decade, corresponding 
gains in productivity in the decades after that were maintained in 
substantial part through increased working hours, and two other 
key mechanisms that functioned, until the onset of the Great 
Recession, to generally mask decades-long deterioration in the 
quality of economic life for working-class households and all but 
the top quintile of middle-class households.128  The first of these 
mechanisms had to do with the possibility—at least until early in 
the 1990s—of increasing household, if not individual, income 
through more women coming into the labor force, a phenomenon 
leading to the generalized rise of the two-paycheck family.  As for 
the second mechanism that provisionally masked the effects of 
increasing wealth and income inequality, it had to do with the 
growing availability of cheap credit.129 
With this second mechanism, we also come to another causal 
factor behind economic polarization that dominant sound bites 
tend to ignore.  This has to do with the increasing proportion of 
future income from production that has been absorbed since the 
end of the 1970s by the so-called FIRE sector.  By now there is 
ample reason to suspect that growing dependence on cheap credit 
for consumption, and even subsistence, has ultimately been made 
possible by recycling the very wealth and income that has been 
redistributed upward to the effect of fueling increasing inequality 
in the first place.  Indeed, as often noted, upward redistribution 
has been especially targeted toward the financial heights of the 
economy.130 
 
128 Lawrence Mishel, Causes of Wage Stagnation, ECON. POL’Y INST. 1 (Jan. 6, 
2015), https://files.epi.org/2013/causes_of_wage_stagnation.pdf [https://perma.cc/L5JU-
QR4G]; Lawrence Mishel, Elise Gould & Josh Bivens, Wage Stagnation in Nine 
Charts, ECON. POL’Y INST. 4 (Jan. 6, 2015), https://files.epi.org/2013/wage-stagnation-
in-nine-charts.pdf [https://perma.cc/2BUN-KDH3]. 
129 The Productivity-Pay Gap, ECON. POL’Y INST., http://www.epi.org/productivity-
pay-gap/ [https://perma.cc/3VZQ-M797] (last updated July 2019); RICHARD D. WOLFF, 
CAPITALISM HITS THE FAN: THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC MELTDOWN AND WHAT TO DO 
ABOUT IT 153–54 (2d ed. 2013). 
130 See sources cited supra notes 8, 38; see also Bradford M. Van Arnum & Michele 
I. Naples, Financialization and Income Inequality in the United States, 1967–2010, 72 
AM. J. ECON. & SOCIO. 1158, 1165 (2013); Ken-Hou Lin & Donald Tomaskovic-Devey, 
Financialization and U.S. Income Inequality, 1970–2008, 118 AM. J. SOCIO. 1284, 
1289, 1313 (2013); Eckhard Hein, Finance-Dominated Capitalism and Redistribution 
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B. Debt, Mortgage Securitization, and the FIRE Sector 
The resort to cheap credit to make household ends meet was 
already becoming evident in the 1980s.  That era, of course, wit-
nessed the escalating ubiquity of the credit card or plastic economy 
as well as an explosion in home equity loans after the 1986 Tax 
Reform Act and the increasing resort to using one’s home as an 
ATM.131  It also gave us the cultural trope of the supersized—and 
even spendthrift—American consumer and the associated emer-
gence on television and radio of the personal finance expert and 
advice industry.132  Also highly visible was the rise of student debt 
as the preferred means of financing tuition increases that were 
outpacing inflation at institutions of higher education.133  Another 
sign of the times, of course, was the rise of the bank fee–cum–toll 
booth economy that we are still growing accustomed to.  Indeed, 
according to Harvard Business School’s Robin Greenwood and 
David Scharfstein, between 1980 and 2012 the financial services 
industry—a category they confine to the activities of asset 
management and household credit provision professionals alone—
has increased its share of United States gross domestic product 
(“GDP”) from 4.9% to 7.9%.134 
Less culturally visible but even more significant in the 1980s 
was the meteoric rise of structured finance, with its ever-
increasing array of individually tailored products for high-end 
investors.  Among these products were both the first notable form 
of credit card debt securitization135 and the early expansion of the 
securitization of residential and commercial mortgage debt.  The 
latter took place through the mortgage-backed security—a rechris-
 
of Income: A Kaleckian Perspective 2–4 (Levy Econ. Inst., Working Paper No. 746, 
2013), http://www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/wp_746.pdf [https://perma.cc/5CCP-GQJG]. 
131 See, e.g., Julia Patterson Forrester, Mortgaging the American Dream: A 
Critical Evaluation of the Federal Government’s Promotion of Home Equity Financing, 
69 TUL. L. REV. 373, 380–81 (1994); HYMAN, supra note 33, at 234–36. 
132 See SCHOR, supra note 33, at 18–21, 24. 
133 JOEL BEST & ERIC BEST, THE STUDENT LOAN MESS: HOW GOOD INTENTIONS 
CREATED A TRILLION-DOLLAR PROBLEM 47–48 (2014); Susanne Soederberg, Student 
Loans, Debtfare and the Commodification of Debt: The Politics of Securitization and 
the Displacement of Risk, 40 CRITICAL SOCIO. 689, 696–700 (2014); Charlie Eaton et 
al., The Financialization of U.S. Higher Education, 14 SOCIO-ECON. REV. 507, 513–
14, 529 (2016). 
134 Robin Greenwood & David Scharfstein, The Growth of Finance, 27 J. ECON. 
PERSPS. 3, 3–4 (2013). The peak year was 2006, when GDP share was 8.3%. Id. at 3.  
135 Between 1989, when the Federal Reserve began keeping records, and 1991, ten 
percent of consumer installment debt—in autos and revolving loans—was securitized. 
See JACK RASMUS, EPIC RECESSION: PRELUDE TO GLOBAL DEPRESSION 209 (2010). 
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tened and, eventually, vastly scaled-up form of the pre–Great 
Depression mortgage bond.136  Sidelined since the 1920s,137 the 
mortgage bond’s initial return came as a means of raising housing 
finance directly from the capital markets to fund the Fair Housing 
Act (“FHA”) of 1968’s section 235 program, which aimed to extend 
credit to promote inner-city home ownership after the urban 
unrest of the late 1960s.138  Though the section 235 program ef-
fectively ended by the early 1970s amidst allegations of fraud 
against the African American borrowers who were its intended 
beneficiaries, the revivification of mortgage securitization was 
sustained by the new Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation 
(“Freddie Mac”).139 
Freddie Mac had been created in 1970 to facilitate the 
development of a secondary market in conventional mortgages140 
by purchasing and bundling into securities loans originated by 
savings and loans banks rather than mortgage companies.  It thus 
complemented the function of the Federal National Mortgage 
Association (“FNMA” or “Fannie Mae”) and its counterpart, the 
Government National Mortgage Association (“GNMA” or “Ginnie 
Mae”).141  Ginnie Mae had initially specialized in an early form of 
the revived mortgage bond—known more specifically as the 
mortgage “pass[-]through[ ]” security.  It was this same type of 
security, then, that Freddie Mac initially draw upon to help 
sustain initiatives like the section 235 program.142  Fannie Mae, 
on the other hand, would not issue its own initial mortgage pass-
 
136 FRANK J. FABOZZI & FRANCO MODIGLIANI, MORTGAGE AND MORTGAGE-
BACKED SECURITIES MARKETS 18–19, 23, 28–29, 34 (1992). A form of competitive 
mortgage securitization had emerged—and failed—once previously as well in the late 
nineteenth-century. See Michael Simkovic, Competition and Crisis in Mortgage 
Securitization, 88 IND. L.J. 213, 216–18 (2013). 
137 William N. Goetzmann & Frank Newman, Securitization in the 1920s, 1, 18 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 15650, 2010). 
138 See LOUIS HYMAN, DEBTOR NATION: THE HISTORY OF AMERICA IN RED INK 
229–30 (2011). 
139 See HYMAN, supra note 33, at 197. 
140 Id. at 203; HYMAN, supra note 138, at 231. Freddie Mac was created through 
the Emergency Home Finance Act of 1970. 
141 Fannie Mae originated as a New Deal–era government-sponsored entity 
created in 1938 to buy mortgages from depository institutions and, in effect, to 
federally insure them. It was through the 1968 FHA that Fannie Mae was made into 
a fully private corporation and split in two. Alongside the entity that kept its name 
was Ginnie Mae, which became a wholly owned government corporation focused on 
FHA and other government-insured mortgages. See FABOZZI & MODIGLIANI, supra 
note 136, at 19–20, 23. 
142 Id. at 21–22. 
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through bond, which did officially bear the name of a “mortgage-
backed securit[y],” until 1981.143  By 1983, however, Freddie Mac 
would become the key backer of the first collateralized mortgage 
obligation (“CMO”), a more exotic subtype of the conventional 
pass-through variety of the MBS.144 
Even so, it was not until the late 1990s—after an early part of 
the decade spent still in the shadow of the Savings & Loans and 
junk bond crises of the 1980s—that the MBS truly began to emerge 
as a structurally significant new means for asserting financial 
ownership claims over revenue streams routed through real 
estate.145  In 1997, the stage was set for the sharp run up that 
began in 2001 when regulators cleared the way for private label 
residential MBS (“RMBS”) products.  Private label securitization, 
in turn, became instrumental in the parallel rise of so called credit 
creating shadow banks beyond the reach of the Federal Reserve, 
with the shadow banks themselves then stimulating further 
securitization.146  By the early 1990s, for example, of the roughly 
one trillion dollars in outstanding home mortgage debt—a total 
that was similar to the figure for 2000—only thirty-five percent 
 
143 Id. at 23. 
144 Id. at 25. The first CMO was created for Freddie Mac by the investment banks 
Solomon Brothers and First Boston. The special purpose entity (“SPE”) issuing the 
CMO holds multiple pools of securities and then offers tranches for potential investor 
purchase. See Laura Choi, Creating a Marketplace: Information Exchange and the 
Secondary Market for Community Development Loans 39 (Fed. Rsrv. Bank of S.F. Cmty. 
Dev. Inv. Ctr., Working Paper No. 2007-01, 2007), https://www.frbsf.org/community-
development/files/wp07-011.pdf [https://perma.cc/88E8-AEVK]. The tranches repre-
sent categorizations based on different risk and maturity dates—allowing for the 
further splitting of the underlying loans in various ways. See Andrew Kelman, 
Mortgage-Backed Securities and Collateralized Mortgage Obligations: Prudent CRA 
Investment Opportunities, CMTY. INVS. (Fed. Rsrv. Bank of S.F., S.F., Cal.), Mar. 2002, 
at 20, 22, https://www.frbsf.org/community-development/files/mbs.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
Z7AR-DEJM]. CMOs thus differ in several ways from the class of conventional pass-
through securities that usually take the name of “mortgage-backed securities,” a 
category to which they both, technically, belong. Overall, one can think of the CMO as 
derivative of the plain vanilla pass-through MBS, including insofar as the CMO can 
pool conventional MBSs together. By the latter half of the 1980s, because most CMOs 
were issued by real estate mortgage investment conduits (“REMIC”) the terms CMO 
and REMIC became largely synonymous. Id. 
145 See RASMUS, supra note 135, at 205, 208. 
146 Adam J. Levitin & Susan M. Wachter, Explaining the Housing Bubble, 100 
GEO. L.J. 1177, 1182–83 (2012). The term “shadow banks” encompasses various 
financial intermediaries arising especially after the 1990s, including investment 
banks, insurance companies, hedge and private pension funds, real estate investment 
trusts, private equity firms, and the new financial wings of large corporations like 
General Motors. See RASMUS, supra note 135, at 212–13. Among what made their 
credit creation activities possible was the elimination or reduction of minimum 
reserve requirements of the kind that restricts ordinary commercial banks. Id. at 213. 
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was securitized—most of this being sold to Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac.147  Of the some ten trillion dollars in home mortgage 
debt attached to residential property by 2008148—approximately 
four trillion dollars of which was issued between 2002 and 2006 
alone, including some half that being sub-prime149—some ninety 
percent of the total was securitized with about fifty percent coming 
through private-label MBS activity.150 
Real estate has thus played a major role in fueling the FIRE 
sector.  Indeed, real estate has long comprised the largest asset 
category in most, if not all, economies,151 a striking fact relative to 
what classical economists like Mill assumed about the likely policy 
fate of land’s “unearned increment.”152  Of course, this first fact 
cannot be separated from a second that is just as important—
namely, that in the United States, as well as countries like Canada 
and Australia, in the recent past mortgage lending has comprised 
as much as approximately eighty percent of bank loans.153  
Consequently, it is lending against built structures and especially 
land—as national income accounting practices tend to obscure by 
not properly disaggregating these distinct components of real 
estate prices—rather than productive capital investment that has 
driven credit expansion.154  In turn, it is also the quintessential 
form of property in land that has enabled further debt to be issued 
against other assets—as well as for debt initially created against 
real estate to move toward those other assets.155  The final element 
 
147 RASMUS, supra note 135, at 209; Fligstein & Goldstein, supra note 7, at 59 
fig.2. 
148 Andrea Riquier, What the Shrinking Amount of Mortgage Debt Tells Us About 
the Housing Market, MARKETWATCH (Feb. 23, 2016, 8:45 AM), http://www.marketwatch. 
com/story/what-the-shrinking-amount-of-mortgage-debt-tells-us-about-the-housing-
market-2016-02-22 [https://perma.cc/93PK-UVLF]; WOLFF, supra note 129, at 145. 
149 RASMUS, supra note 135, at 211. 
150 Fligstein & Goldstein, supra note 7, at 23, 59 fig.2. 
151 Hudson, supra note 64, at 250; SAMUEL STEIN, CAPITAL CITY: GENTRIFICATION 
AND THE REAL ESTATE STATE 2 (2019). 
152 See supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
153 HUDSON, supra note 64, at 250. 
154 MIAN & SUFI, supra note 33, at 80–81 (considering arguments questioning the 
pitting of housing debt against so-called “animal spirits” as the real driver of credit 
expansion). Within the existing literature, one also finds researchers pressing the case 
for another variety of intellectual uncertainty—over whether new mortgage products 
pushed housing prices to rise as opposed to whether such products emerged due to 
market participants expecting ongoing appreciation. See Morris A. Davis & Stijn Van 
Nieuwerburgh, Housing, Finance, and the Macroeconomy, in 5B HANDBOOK OF 
REGIONAL AND URBAN ECONOMICS 753, 804 (Gilles Duranton, J. Vernon Henderson 
& William C. Strange eds., 2015). 
155 See infra text accompanying notes 170–171.  
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within the networked relation between the parts of the FIRE 
sector—meaning, the I for “insurance”—also runs in no small part 
through real estate, whether because mortgage lending necessi-
tates the purchase of home insurance, because growing insurance 
company reserves get directed back into real estate, or because 
banks swollen from real estate lending acquire or merge with 
insurance companies.156 
C. Financial Asset-Price Inflation 
One prerequisite for grappling with the growth of the FIRE 
sector since the 1970s—including the attendant proliferation of 
financial proprietorship claims on other assets—is that we move 
past the notional idea that debt is simply going toward investment 
in productive assets.157  Highly idealized, this idea captures nei-
ther the dynamics driving household debt expansion in the real 
world nor the preference for debt leverage that became so visible 
on corporate balance sheets starting in the 1980s and that has 
been so visibly apart of the post–Great Recession era of easy 
money.158  Putting aside other forms of government debt, nor does 
it do well in capturing the related rise of securitization. 
This, of course, is not to say that finance, including through 
debt, can have no place in bridging gaps that would otherwise 
prevent ordinary consumers from making purchases or firms from 
investing in plants and equipment.  Nor is it to say that the finan-
cial sector floats freely of the real economy.  Indeed, to highlight 
how land was central rather than incidental to originally ground-
 
156 HUDSON, supra note 31, at 150–52, 161. 
157 At least at the margins of orthodox theory, this view has become highly 
questionable. See, e.g., William Easterly, Roumeen Islam & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Shaken 
and Stirred: Explaining Growth Volatility, 2000 ANN. WORLD BANK CONF. ON DEV. 
ECON. 191, 208 n.4, http://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/525851468740663147/ 
pdf/multi0page.pdf [https://perma.cc/5YAG-H7PK]; Jean-Louis Arcand, Enrico Berkes 
& Ugo Panizza, Too Much Finance? 24 (Int’l Monetary Fund Working Paper, No. 
WP/12/161, 2012); see also Greenwood & Scharfstein, supra note 134, at 5–6 (working, 
however, from the more traditional sense of unreserved optimism about finance’s 
benefits). 
158 Since the Great Recession, the prioritization of using newly printed money to 
keep financial asset prices high—and still inflating—has meant corporate debt 
remains as important as ever. Beyond the sums indirectly channeled into the five to 
six trillion dollars in stock buybacks and dividend payments, low interest rates and 
free money policy have meant an ongoing explosion in the corporate bond market. This 
has included a large expansion in the market for “junk” bonds issued by the very large 
percentage of corporations with performance problems. See JACK RASMUS, CENTRAL 
BANKERS AT THE END OF THEIR ROPE? MONETARY POLICY AND THE COMING 
DEPRESSION 318–19 (2017); Reid et al., supra note 39, at 24, 29–30. 
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ing the idea of property-as-rent is to suggest precisely the opposite.  
Then there is also the fact that complex structured products like 
the CMO could not exist absent the abstraction of housing, in all 
its physicality, into another type of property.159  That said, to 
question the oversimplified idea that debt is merely going toward 
productive investment is to say that starting from our actual 
empirical-historical situation is a must.  For example, as has been 
known for some time, in both Europe and the United States, it is 
through current earnings—rather than external means, whether 
on the debt or stock markets—that most corporations finance 
actual capital investment.160  Indeed, in this regard, the points 
reviewed at the end of Section III.B about the overwhelming 
importance of real estate lending become even more striking. 
Where, then, has the mass of new funds, which appeared as 
capital until the Great Recession threatened their evaporation, 
gone?  In the remainder of Section III.C, I will discuss the idea of 
debt-driven asset-price inflation as one likely answer.  As is now 
finally being recognized, since the 1980s firms have directed 
increasingly available financial resources not to investment or 
wage growth but to activities like stock buybacks, dividend 
payments,161 corporate takeovers, and so on.162  Through such ac-
tivities directing debt or credit garnished from elsewhere in the 
economy to the purchase of already existing assets, there has been 
a marked effect of inflating their values.  As economist Dirk 
Bezemer puts it, beyond “financing innovation,” what Joseph 
Schumpeter called “the secondary wave” of credit thus becomes 
 
159 Kelman, supra note 144, at 22. 
160 See, e.g., HENWOOD, supra note 8, at 72–73, 149; see also Fox & Lorsch, supra 
note 8, at 50 (providing an updated assessment drawing on Henwood’s never celebrat-
ed work). 
161 Indeed, since 2010 alone, corporate stock buybacks and dividend payments 
have summed to close to six trillion dollars. See Mark DeCambre, S&P 500 Companies 
Spent $7 Trillion on Buybacks and Dividends and “Been Rewarded” by Coronavirus 
Bailouts, Says Social Capital CEO, MARKETWATCH (Apr. 25, 2020, 11:33 AM), 
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/sp-500-companies-spent-7-trillion-on-buybacks-and-
dividends-and-been-rewarded-by-coronavirus-bailouts-says-social-capital-ceo-2020-04-
22 [https://perma.cc/8AUJ-4H9K]. With the vast money-printing operation involved 
in the bailout largely flowing to the FIRE sector, this sum is most striking because it 
roughly mirrors the loss in equity of the ordinary homeowner. Landy, supra note 38, 
at 2, 5–6. 
162 See Fox & Lorsch, supra note 8, at 51–52, 54–56; see also DAVIS, supra note 8, 
at 19–21, 63–64, 84–85; Roger Martin, The Age of Customer Capitalism, HARV. BUS. 
REV., Jan.–Feb. 2010, at 58, 59–60; LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH 3, 
5 (2012). The issue was also treated extensively in the 1990s. See HENWOOD, supra 
note 8, at 264–65, 269–74. See also supra note 147 and accompanying text. 
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speculative once it gravitates toward “assets already in place, 
rather than new production.”163 
Outside of the world of corporate finance, the same is even 
more dramatically evident in the real estate context—at least 
“assuming that mortgages finance transactions in existing real 
estate rather than new building” as, in point of fact, Bezemer notes 
“is mostly . . . the case.”164  Indeed, here it is worth recalling that 
as President Obama’s Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission found, 
during the peak years of the explosion in mortgage lending from 
2001 to 2004, by far the most debt issued was to refinance the 
mortgages of existing homeowners rather than those of new pur-
chasers, a category that would not, at any rate, be restricted to 
purchasers of new constructions.165  The fact that such a large 
share of lending was devoted to refinancing existing mortgages 
may have been one reason why the post-2007 foreclosure crisis hit 
African Americans—especially, elderly African American women 
homeowners—particularly hard.166 
Consider the economist Michael Hudson’s calculation that 
some eighty percent of asset-price gains—a concept he distin-
guishes from capital gains in the tax code—occurred in the real 
estate sector, with the remainder going to bonds and stocks.167  
Using Federal Reserve Flow of Funds data, he notes that in 2007 
the rise in price for the country’s raw land rose by $2.5 trillion, a 
figure that comes to more than twenty percent of national 
income.168  As for the distinction between asset-price gains and 
capital gains, it is important because the latter are only declared 
for tax purposes if considered “realized.”  Even putting aside the 
 
163 Dirk J. Bezemer, Schumpeter Might Be Right Again: The Functional 
Differentiation of Credit, 24 J. EVOLUTIONARY ECON. 935, 938 (2014). As Bezemer 
notes, Schumpeter’s idea was not restricted to real estate assets already in place but 
existing assets in general. See id.; see also RASMUS, supra note 39, at 398–400 
(discussing the famed heterodox economist Hyman Minsky’s distinct, but in ways 
compatible, idea of economies entering stages of “Ponzi” finance). 
164 Bezemer, supra note 163. 
165 FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, PRELIMINARY STAFF REPORT: THE MORTGAGE 
CRISIS 5 (2010), https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/files/docs/historical/fct/fcic/fcic_report_ 
prelim_mortgage_20100407.pdf [https://perma.cc/FW89-JMF4]. 
166 See, e.g., Gary Dymski, Jesus Hernandez & Lisa Mohanty, Race, Gender, 
Power, and the U.S. Subprime Mortgage and Foreclosure Crisis: A Meso Analysis, 19 
FEMINIST ECON. 124, 135–38 (2013) (discussing how lenders targeted minorities 
during the mortgage crisis); Landy, supra note 38, at 6. 
167 HUDSON, supra note 31, at 109. 
168 Michael Hudson, The Transition from Industrial Capitalism to a Financialized 
Bubble Economy, 1 WORLD REV. POL. ECON. 81, 85 (2010). Hudson’s own refinement 
of the Fed’s flow-of-fund figures puts 2007 raw land value at $3.5 to $4 trillion. Id. 
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decades-long decline in the tax rates applied to capital gains, the 
category simply excludes “unrealized” real estate gains like those 
that result from the transfer of property on death or from sales 
proceeds that are then put into new purchases.  This, moreover, is 
not even taking into account the various other ways that decades 
of tax policy has altogether removed residential and commercial 
real estate from effective taxation, thus freeing up potential 
government revenue to be used instead for the purposes of creating 
financial property-in-rent that is ultimately transformed into 
bank interest.169 
As another example, consider that from 2001 to 2005—at the 
peak of the last housing bubble—low interest rates and escalating 
house price values allowed homeowners in the United States to 
extract one trillion dollars per year from their houses after closing 
costs and mortgage payments.170  Triple the annual amount of the 
previous decade, approximately half of this total went back into 
the housing market through new home purchases—though not 
necessarily purchases of new constructions—and improvements; 
another quarter went to non-home financial assets; and of the 
remaining quarter devoted to personal consumption, even much of 
this still went to paying credit card, auto loan, and student loan 
debt.171   
In all of these ways, therefore, the vast expansion of derivative 
financial asset forms staking ownership claims directly or indirect-
ly on real estate value—that itself is generated out of more basic 
 
169 Id. at 87. As for the other key elements of tax policy, they include the ability of 
commercial real estate owners to repeatedly, and on an accelerated basis, write off tax 
costs through depreciating assets that are in fine repair—and when they can no longer 
do so, re-transfer them to new owners who can do the same—the notorious tax-shelter-
creating effect of the home mortgage interest deduction, and others. See id. at 96; see 
also KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE 
UNITED STATES, 190–91 (1985); Joseph J. Thorndike, How Tax Law Fertilized 
America’s “Crabgrass Frontier,” 146 TAX NOTES 1439, 1439–40 (2015). Recent 
technical studies have approached the mortgage deduction from the standpoint of its 
negative “welfare effects.” See Davis & Van Nieuwerburgh, supra note 154, at 800–
02. On changes to the deduction made under the Trump administration, see Jim 
Tankersley & Ben Casselman, As Mortgage-Interest Deduction Vanishes, Housing 
Market Offers a Shrug, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 4, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/ 
04/business/economy/mortgage-interest-deduction-tax.html [https://perma.cc/Z9US-
25BG]. 
170 Landy, supra note 38, at 2. 
171 Id. (noting that by 2012, six trillion dollars in housing value disappeared). See 
also Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dark Side of Universal Banking: Financial 
Conglomerates and the Origins of the Subprime Financial Crisis, 41 CONN. L. REV. 
963, 967 (2009) (providing similar estimates for the period “between mid-2006 and the 
end of 2008”). 
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forms like the home mortgage loan—bring to mind the nineteenth-
century identity between property’s quintessentially most irreduc-
ible form, in land, and rent.  Indeed, as I turn to directly, insofar 
as landed property can be disaggregated from built structures in 
the pricing of real estate, credit’s acceleration into asset-price 
inflation—rather than productive investment—only further 
reminds us of why the now largely forgotten conception of 
property-as-rent was so vital in the first place.   
IV.  THE SINGLE-FAMILY RENTAL-BACKED 
SECURITY AND DEBT-DRIVEN PROPERTY-AS-RENT 
In this final Part of the Article, I open with a discussion of 
long-term trends in the composition of home price values in the 
residential real estate market in the United States.  Using unique 
data compiled by the economist Morris Davis, Section IV.A is 
organized around a series of graphs looking at both the national 
and selected state- or metro-level residential real estate markets.  
Through these figures, I show the importance of underlying land 
or site price values relative to the cost of built structures and 
demonstrate their role as the key driver of increasing home price 
values in the residential real estate market.  In Section IV.B, I 
then turn to the single-family residential rental-backed security 
as one new example of our ongoing reliance on securitized financial 
asset property built on real estate value.  Section IV.C then con-
cludes by discussing some normative alternatives to our ongoing 
reliance on real estate securitization and the new forms of 
property-in-rent like the SFRBS it generates.   
The conclusion that integrates Part IV’s three subsections 
with one another as well as with Parts I to III is worth stating up 
front.  This is, namely, that disaggregating residential real estate 
prices as I do in Section IV.A—so as to isolate the role of the land 
value component in driving up home price values—crystallizes the 
key policy question that the perspective from property-as-rent 
poses.  How socially useful is it to inflate real estate prices in the 
way our legal system has encouraged by providing tax breaks for 
accumulating mortgage debt, in the residential real estate context, 
and other interest payments, especially in the commercial real 
estate context, through allowing for accelerated and fictitious 
depreciation?  To do so might make sense if the reason for running 
up real estate debt—whether in the form of an ordinary home-
owner taking out a mortgage or a private equity firm using lever-
age to buy up foreclosed homes to lease back to the foreclosed—
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was rooted in “rising construction costs” functioning to “increase 
the cost of buildings and other capital improvements.”172  However, 
if higher real estate prices “simply reflect higher prices for land 
sites that have no cost of production,” then using tax policy to 
facilitate the inflation of those prices is “merely [to] make[ ] new 
buyers” and non-owner-occupying tenants “pay more,” in mortgage 
and rental payments, respectively.173  In other words, the less that 
the growth of real estate prices comes from investing in new 
construction and capital improvements, the less can it be argued 
that “rising property prices elicit more investment in the form of 
construction activity.”174  Moreover, if the growth of real estate 
price values is really coming from “bid[ding] up” land prices, it is 
not the case that more land, as a limited asset “provided freely by 
nature,” will somehow come into supply.175  Rather, the activity of 
providing the homes, office buildings, and industrial plants that 
already sit atop such land will garner an increasing economic rent.  
Consequently, it would make more sense to shift to a policy port-
folio geared toward taxing away this economic rent rather than 
facilitating its insulation from taxation.  Of course, there is one 
way that rising prices for underlying land or sites could be made 
to coincide with an increase in its supply, so to speak.  This occurs 
when more public goods investment—in schools, transport net-
works, and the like—increases the supply of attractive land sites.  
Such a possibility, however, would only strengthen the case for 
shifting our policy portfolio, given that, as “has long been argued,” 
the “public sector should recover the cost of this infrastructure by 
taxing” the resulting “increase” in land’s “site value[ ] along the 
[more attractive] route.”176 
A. The Increasing Importance of Land’s Site Value 
Using pre-crisis data, Morris A. Davis and Jonathan Heathcoate 
estimate the total market value of housing stock in the United 
States in 2005 as summing to $24.1 trillion—some one hundred 
and fifty percent of the combined capitalization of the major stock 
exchanges.177  In pointing to this fact, they have been among the 
 
172 Hudson, supra note 168, at 99–100. 




177 Morris A. Davis & Jonathan Heathcote, The Price and Quantity of Residential 
Land in the United States, 54 J. MONETARY ECON. 2595, 2596 (2007). This includes 
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most prominent economists to argue for the consequent impor-
tance of disaggregating housing into a bundle of two different 
components: structures, on the one hand, and land or sites, on the 
other.  Within this distinction there is another they intend as well, 
according to which house or home prices should ideally be decom-
posed into a weighted average of the cost of produced structures 
and the price of unproduced land or sites.  Accordingly, in their 
pioneering 2007 paper, Davis and Heathcoate employ a method for 
isolating land price values from home price values by subtracting 
the explicitly determinable replacement costs of structures, after 
accounting for depreciation.  Qualitatively speaking, as the authors 
explain, the residual “land” price data that is inferred from this 
method can be thought of as “anything that makes a house worth 
more than the cost of putting up a new structure of similar size 
and quality on a vacant lot.”178  This indirect method for deter-
mining land price values through inference from house prices and 
structure costs, as they explain, is necessary to avoid what are 
otherwise likely to be intractable direct measurement problems.179 
While significant limitations remain on this indirect method 
for determining land price values, especially ones that may under-
estimate their magnitude,180  Davis and Heathcoate have provided 
a series comprising the first constant-quality price and quantity 
indexes for total United States residential land stock.181  Their key 
purpose in doing so has been to help us better “explore[ ] the evo-
 
owner-occupied, rental, and vacant units. Id. at 2603 n.16. Davis has also constructed 
an assessment of all land values in the United States. See Morris A. Davis, The Price 
and Quantity of Land by Legal Form of Organization in the United States, 39 REG’L 
SCI. & URB. ECON. 350 (2009). 
178 Davis & Heathcoate, supra note 177, at 2595. As they further explain, while 
they use the Bureau of Economic Affairs’ (“BEA”) published series for replacement 
costs as their basis to estimate structure values, they remove the accumulated value 
of commissions from existing home sales (which the BEA counts as part of residential 
investment) because it does not increase the stock of structures in place. The result is 
to reduce the BEA’s estimates by about 8.5%. Id. at 2601. 
179 Id. at 2596 (explaining that the intractability derives from the fact that except 
for “land sales at the undeveloped fringes of metro areas—where land is relatively 
cheap—there are very few direct observations of land prices from vacant lot sales, 
because most desirable residential locations have already been built on”). 
180 See infra note 196. 
181 See Davis & Heathcoate, supra note 177. The authors also review the most 
prominent of the few earlier attempts to estimate land price values, including data for 
home versus site prices for properties for which the FHA was the mortgage issuer—
producing discernible estimates for the years between 1935 and 1979—and A.D. 
Manvel’s well-known land versus improvements estimates for real estate parcels in 
twelve large assessment areas from the late 1960s. See id. at 2605; Allen D. Manvel, 
Land Use in 106 Large Cities, in THREE LAND RESEARCH STUDIES 18, 19 (1968). 
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lution of land and structures prices separately” so as to “make[ ] 
it . . . easier to understand the dynamics of house prices.”182  
Indeed, as they note in their paper, doing so allows real estate’s 
demand side to be differentiated into “a capital input in home 
production and leisure activities,” composed of the structure cost, 
and a separate source, the land price, that represents the 
“capitaliz[ation of] the market value of local schools and the 
commuting distance from employment centers.”183  Assessed from 
the supply side, as they note, the distinction between land or, 
equivalently, as I have also put it, site prices and structure costs 
proves “even more stark.”184  This is because it suggests that “in-
creases in the demand for housing will have very different effects 
on the prices of these two components, even if there is no change 
in the relative taste for structures versus land.”185  Overall, there-
fore, the disaggregation of home price values will warn against 
expecting changes in demand-side variables like interest rates and 
demographics to significantly affect the relative price of struc-
tures, which depend on factors like the relative productivity of the 
construction industry and materials costs.186  Because “desirable 
land is largely non-reproducible,” on the other hand, it is the 
opposite that is to be expected with respect to changes in demand 
for housing, itself, which is more likely to “have a large effect” in 
driving up “the price of land.”187  Especially to the extent that the 
demand for housing has, itself, been contingent on the expansion 
of housing debt since the 1970s,188 the logic behind Davis and 
Heathcoate’s approach coincides with the observations made at 
the end of Part II about real estate’s ability to demonstrate the 
ongoing vitality of the conception of property-as-rent.  That is, sep-
arating land from structures demonstrates how dependent real 
estate price values—and hence the various forms of new financial 
proprietorship claims attaching to them—are on underlying 
scarcity premiums associated with land rather than real estate 
developer entrepreneurialism.189 
The remainder of Section IV.A uses the data that Davis and 
Heathcoate have made available to researchers to graphically de-
 
182 Davis & Heathcoate, supra note 177. 
183 Id. at 2597. 
184 Id. 
185 Id. 
186 See id. 
187 Id. 
188 See supra note 154. 
189 See Davis & Heathcoate, supra note 177, at 2613–15, 2618. 
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pict some relevant long-term trends.  Figures 1 to 3 look at rela-
tionships between prices for home price values on the residential 
real estate market, structure costs, and inferred land or site prices 
for the United States as a whole in the period from 1930 to 2000.190  
Here, I have adjusted all nominal dollar values in the data to real 
year 2000 levels using the Price Consumption Expenditure Index 
of the Bureau of Economic Affairs’ National Income and Product 
Accounts191 and indexed to 1930.192  Using additional data for the 
state and metro area level that Davis has made available to the 
Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, now hosted by the American 
Enterprise Institute, Figures 4 to 6 then drill down below the 
national or aggregate level.193  While the state and metro area194 
data sets have the benefit of being more current, extending to 
2018, they begin only in the mid-1970s and mid-1980s respec-
tively.  For the purposes of the Figures 4 to 6, I have also simplified 
by using only a single information point for each given year, rather 
than the full set of quarterly numbers the data sets include.195 
As Figure 1 makes clear, the rapid ascent of home prices in 
the residential real estate market did not begin until the early 
1970s, a fact that is telling when considered relative to the context 
discussed in Part III.  As per the central point of Davis and Heath-
coate’s exercise, even more important is what Figure 1 shows 
 
190 See Historical Land Price Indicators, AM. ENTER. INST., https://www.aei.org/ 
historical-land-price-indicators/ [https://perma.cc/2QDM-3SXU] (last visited Dec. 23, 
2020) (containing the data set utilized by Davis and Heathcoate in their article, supra 
note 177). 
191 In using the PCE rather than the CPI or some other index to make the adjust-
ment, the presentation of the data follows the method that Davis and Heathcoate 
suggest. See Table 2.3.4. Price Indexes for Personal Consumption Expenditures by 
Major Type of Product: Annual, FED. RSRV. BANK OF ST. LOUIS, Line 1, https://fred. 
stlouisfed.org/release/tables?rid=53&eid=43831&snid [https://perma.cc/QRF4-UT7W] 
(last visited Dec. 23, 2020). 
192 The presentation of the data diverges from the authors’. See Davis & 
Heathcote, supra note 177, at 2607 fig.1 (beginning from and indexing to 1975). 
193 See Annual Historical Dataset, 1930–2000, AM. ENTER. INST., https://www.aei 
.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/LANDDATA_HISTORY.xlsx [https://perma.cc/AD3L-
KDWC] (last visited Dec. 23, 2020).  
194 See Quarterly MSA Dataset, 1984:Q1–2018:Q2, AM. ENTER. INST., https://www 
.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/LANDDATA.MSA_.2018Q2.xlsx [https://perma.cc/ 
R9XS-KVWE] (last visited Dec. 23, 2020). The figures in this Article use data up to 
January 1, 2016. The metro area data is linked to other work by Davis with the 
Federal Reserve Board’s Michael Palumbo. See Morris A. Davis & Michael G. 
Palumbo, The Price of Residential Land in Large U.S. Cities, 63 J. URB. ECON. 352, 
353 (2008). 
195 Figures 2 to 6 do not generally correspond to any that Davis and co-author 
present. Therefore, there is no question of if or how their presentation differs from my 
own. See, e.g., supra note 192 (demonstrating this in the case of Figure 1). 
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about the role of aggregate land price value increases as the key 
driver of aggregate home price value increases in the period after 
the ascent began.  The additional information Figure 2 reveals 
about the greater volatility of aggregate land price value as com-
pared to aggregate structure cost value provides a different win-
dow into the same point.  
Figure 1: Growth in Aggregate Prices of Homes, 
Land, and Structures, 1930–2000 
That is, Figure 2 shows that fluctuation in aggregate land 
price value—deriving from the scarcity premiums associated with 
land sites—plays the major role in aggregate home price value 
fluctuations in the real estate market.  Indeed, apart from the few 
years after 1946—when a big drop in aggregate land price values 
went hand in hand with an increase in aggregate home price 
values due to increasing aggregate structure cost values—it has 
been aggregate land price value that has been key in maintaining 
or driving up aggregate home price value in the face of declining 
aggregate structure cost value.  This occurred most dramatically 
in the period from 1970 to 1990, when the overall share of 
aggregate land price value in aggregate home price value doubled 
from twenty to forty percent.196  Throughout this period, repeated 
 
196 Here it is important to make explicit the point alluded to earlier about the 
underestimating tendency, even of Davis and Heathcoate’s version, of the residual-of-
structure cost method for inferring land or site prices. As Hudson explains, assessors 
in the United States often put the land or site price share in home price values at forty 
to as much as sixty percent, the upper end of which pushes well beyond what the 
Federal Reserve, also following a residual-of-structure cost method, reaches. The 
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bouts of declining aggregate structure cost value were outstripped 
by corresponding periods of increasing aggregate land price value. 
Figure 2: Percent Change in Prices of Homes, 
Land, and Structures, 1931–2000 
There is an important related point that Figures 1 to 3 do not 
fully make clear, given that the series represented ends in 2000.  
As Davis and Heathcoate are able to extrapolate further in their 
paper, this is, namely, that this doubling in aggregate land price 
value’s share in aggregate home price value was higher than the 
corresponding increase that took place amidst the peak years of 
the housing bubble of the early 2000s.  In the decade from 1996 to 
2006, in other words, aggregate land price value’s share in 
aggregate home price value increased only about ten percent—
moving from its late 1990s dip down to thirty-four percent to a 
2006 level of forty-six percent.197  Among the noteworthy implica-
tions of this fact would thus seem to be that the bubble of the 2000s 
was neither anomalous nor “unique in history” as has been argued 
by many prominent commentators.198 
A last aspect of the picture that Figures 1 to 3 help paint has 
to do with issues raised in Part III about the inflationary effects of 
attaching debt to assets that are already in place.  For example, as 
Davis and Heathcoate point out, and as Figures 1 to 3 imply, there 
are evidently “intrinsic differences in the price dynamics of new 
versus existing homes,” with “typical newly built homes and 
 
problem with the Fed’s method is that by “valuing buildings at their reproduction cost, 
including capital gains that reflect[ ] rising construction costs” it “leaves an 
unrealistically low residual for land.” Moreover, doing so may “make[ ] land prices 
appear more volatile than overall real estate.” HUDSON, supra note 64, at 264–65. 
197 Davis & Heathcoate, supra note 177, at 2616. 
198 Id. at 2617 (citing ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE 2 (2d ed. 
2005)); see Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, Is the 2007 U.S. Sub-Prime 
Financial Crisis So Different? An International Historical Comparison, 98 AM. ECON. 
REV. 339, 342 (2008) (considering a different kind of rejoinder). 
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existing homes” proving to be “quite different goods.”199  By 2006, 
when aggregate land price value reached about half of the 
aggregate value of the country’s housing stock, buyers were thus 
paying “40% more on average for existing homes relative to newly 
built structures of similar size and quality.”200  One inference to 
draw from this, of course, is the one that the authors do directly: 
namely that “a large fraction of the market value of land under 
existing houses reflects the value placed by home-buyers on these 
older homes’ locations, and that the locations of newly built 
houses, on average, are considered much less desirable.”201  Here, 
we should not fail to realize that “the quantity of new 
development” was and remains “small relative to the existing 
stock of housing.”202  Yet as suggested at the top of this paragraph, 
given the fact that aggregate housing price value increasingly 
comes from scarcity premiums for sites, and eventually will mainly 
do so, there is another possible inference worth considering as 
well.  This concerns whether new financial forms tied legally to 
real estate are proprietary not just because they are rooted in the 
value of housing stock but also because they are rooted in 
payments of scarcity rent that is routed through it.  Indeed, this is 
all the more compelling to the extent that such rent overlaps with 
the kind of rent that was central to making land the right to 
property’s “keystone” form starting at least from the seventeenth-
century, at a time, ironically, that most property scholars would 
call “feudal.”203 
 
199 Davis & Heathcoate, supra note 177, at 2608. 
200 Id. at 2608–09. 
201 Id. at 2609. 
202 Id. at 2613. 
203 See Rose, supra note 96, at 334–37. Of course, among historians of medieval 
Europe, the “feudal” age proper is often restricted to the period from the ninth to thir-
teenth centuries. See, e.g., F.L. GANSHOF, FEUDALISM 131–32, 150 (Philip Grierson 
trans., 1996). 
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Figure 3: Aggregate Home Prices: Share of 
Structures vs. Share of Land, 1930–2000 
Turning briefly to Figures 4 to 6, three points are worth mak-
ing explicit.  First, as expected, despite the limited portrait based 
on only six states, the aggregate tendency is corroborated at the 
state level as well.  That is, as Figure 4 and the solid lines in Figure 
6 for each relevant state suggest, after 1975 and 1985 respectively 
and until 2006, the land price value component of house price 
values increased in every state.  In the major metro areas, as 
Figure 5 shows, they either increased or remained at a steady high 
relative to the overall share of land price values in home price 
values for the state each metro area is located.  Indeed, notwith-
standing the clearly enormous downward ratchet of the bursting 
of the last housing bubble, by 2016 the same overall trend was 
restored for each of the six states amidst the recovery and re-
inflation of the housing market after 2012.  As Figure 5 suggests, 
some metro areas show a land price value component that is yet to 
again surpass the 1985 level or pre-2006 low. 
Figure 4: Land Prices as Share of Home Prices in  
Six States, 1975–2016 
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Figure 5: Land Prices as Share of Home Prices for 
Six Metros, 1985–2016 
Second, both relative to the six states selected and all six 
selected metro areas in these states, the central observation from 
the aggregate data about land price value being driven by scarcity 
premiums is again borne out.  That is, it is in the places that 
intuition tells us are the hottest real estate markets, and those 
which we would informally call the ripest for speculation, that the 
scarcity value of sites has paid the highest premiums.  This is 
evidenced both in the generally greater share that land price value 
has played in the prices of homes in these areas and the sharp 
ascent of land price value’s share of home price value in boom 
times.  Indeed, this latter observation applies with respect to both 
those states and cities that are conventionally considered to be the 
hottest real estate markets.  That is, what intuition would tell us 
are the most overheated of the six state-level real estate markets—
namely, California, New York, and Florida, or, perhaps, Arizona—
are the ones where land price values in the corresponding states 
have made for the highest, and during boom times most sharply 
ascending, share of their respective aggregated home price values.  
Likewise, what intuition tells us are the most overheated markets 
in each of the six states—namely, their respective major metros—
are also areas where the share of land price values relative to home 
price values exceeds the share of land price values in home price 
values for each respective state as a whole.  Finally, as is hinted 
in Figure 6, there is another point to emphasize that Davis and 
Heathcoate also make: in states where homes are “relatively 
expensive (reflecting pricier land), house prices have historically 
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been more volatile” while also “appreciat[ing] more rapidly on 
average.”204 
 
Figure 6: Land Price as Share of House Prices, City vs. State 
B. Securitizing Single-Family Rental Payments: Beyond the 
Democratization of Credit 
A final feature of the state- and metro area-level trends in 
Figures 4 to 6 is worth highlighting as well.  This follows from 
looking at the Great Recession years, from roughly 2007 to 2012.  
As noted in Section IV.A, since 2012, the share of land price values 
in the composition of home price values in all six state and metro 
areas has resumed its upward trajectory—and has now surpassing 
its level during the boom of the mid-1980s in most places.  As Davis 
and Heathcoate’s analysis makes explicit, and as Figures 4 to 6 
also suggest, the post-bubble collapse showed up in the outsize 
 
204 Davis & Heathcoate, supra note 177, at 2618. 
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effect of the decline in land price values on the overall decline in 
home price values.  Of the six states, Arizona is most striking, 
which may seem surprising given its land-rich status.  Arizona 
thus serves as a reminder that scarcity is not just a function of 
open land area but also differential public goods investment, 
which makes it more appropriate, if less intuitive, to speak of 
land’s site scarcity. 
There is a second way that Arizona’s trend—inclusive of that 
for its major metro area of Phoenix—is telling as well.  This is due 
to another factor at work in the extended aftermath of the crisis 
brought on in 2007—namely, a decline in home price values that 
coincided with a rise in the rent-to-price ratio for owner-occupied 
housing across the country.  That is, as purchasing homes became 
less desirable—or, more accurately, unattainable—a greater num-
ber of people were in need of renting rather than buying.  This is 
evident from Figure 7, which is taken directly from another of 
Davis’ articles.205  Indeed, it was in states like Arizona and areas 
like Phoenix that the more lucrative market for rentals and the 
large number of vacant, bank-owned, or underwater homes first 
paved the way for the new form of real estate securitization in the 
form of the SFRBS.206 
 
Figure 7: Gross Rent-Price Ratio Owner-Occupied 
Housing, 1960–2000207 
Since their emergence in 2013, SFRBS offerings have grown 
and mutated rapidly in structure.  Initially, private equity firms 
 
205  Morris A. Davis, Andreas Lehnert & Robert F. Martin, The Rent-Price Ratio 
for the Aggregate Stock of Owner-Occupied Housing, 54 REV. INCOME & WEALTH 279, 
283 fig.1 (2008). 
206 Deirdre Pfeiffer & Joanna Lucio, An Unexpected Geography of Opportunity in 
the Wake of the Foreclosure Crisis: Low-Income Renters in Investor-Purchased 
Foreclosures in Phoenix, Arizona, 36 URB. GEOGRAPHY 1197, 1213 (2015). 
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like the Blackstone Group were simply buying up single-family 
homes left over from the housing crisis at cut-rate prices.208  They 
did so to create a new portfolio of real estate owned (“REO”) rental 
properties.209  These, in turn, could be leased back to the foreclosed, 
among the various others now priced out of the homeownership 
market.210  Very quickly, however, private equity firms partnered 
with investment banks to prepare a new class of real estate deriv-
atives through the pooling of rental payments from such homes 
and slicing them into different tranches with varying levels of 
potential risk and reward.211  As with the MBS before it, the new 
form of bond property that resulted allowed investment banks to 
attract institutional investors like hedge and pension funds to 
invest their large quantities of liquid capital—itself garnered 
either directly from earned incomes originating elsewhere in the 
productive economy or from credit created out of such incomes 
elsewhere in the financial economy—in search of yield.212 
If 2013 was the turning point for the SFRBS, it was partly 
because by then the economy’s ostensible recovery was seeing land 
prices resume their historically upward ascent compared to 
relatively flat structure prices.  The still-high rent-price ratio was 
also likely necessary to spark initial investor interest, especially 
since ratings agencies like Fitch refused to assign ratings to the 
new products due to the absence of historical performance data, 
among other reasons.213  Of course, to the extent that the resur-
gence of house price values suggested that the rent-price ratio 
would fall, other trepidations about whether the SFRBS was built 
to last resulted from fears specific to the rental market.214  Yet 
various reasons for confidence also persisted.  These included the 
oft-cited shift in the supposed preferences of millennials away 
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from owning, which are undoubtedly better seen as deriving from 
necessity.215  There was also the likelihood that pouring money into 
the single-family home market would re-inflate prices and create 
a new class of “[p]redatory [r]entals” owned by “Wall Street 
landlords” whose distance from tenants would make it easier to 
charge assorted new fees and more aggressively push up rates.216  
Residents of Colony Capital’s Colony Starwood homes in Los 
Angeles, for example, have had to absorb a nine- to thirteen-
percent increase in payment rates to stay in their homes.217 
All told, by autumn 2013 Blackstone had readied to issue the 
first SFRBS in a deal backed by Deutsche Bank.  The typically 
Byzantine structure is laid out in Figure 8.218  Known as the 
Invitation Homes 2013­SFR 1, the bond was backed by 3,207 
single-family rental homes spread across Arizona, California, 
Florida, Georgia, and Illinois,219 selected from some 40,000 then 
owned by Blackstone.220  While distributed in a number of states, 
the underlying assets underlying the bond were highly concen-
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trated.  About nine percent of the 3,207, for example, were located 
in Phoenix.221  There was also further concentration within locales.  
A mapping of the included houses in Phoenix shows that the assets 
backing the security were concentrated in low- and middle-income 
neighborhoods, with some “hav[ing] at least one, if not two or 
three, Blackstone-owned homes on just about every block.”222 
The underlying basis of Invitation Homes 2013-SFR 1 in the 
3,207 houses Blackstone selected from its larger stock can be 
compared to the estimated 14.5 million single-family home rental 
units existing across the United States at the outset of 2013, as 
compared to 24.5 million apartment rental units.223  Indeed, the 
impending success of Blackstone’s Invitation Homes 2013-SFR 1 
offering meant that already by the third quarter of 2013 
competition for purchasing single-family homes began to heat up, 
especially as real estate investment trusts (“REITs”) became 
interested.224  While there were no REITs in the business of 
purchasing single-family properties in 2011, as the Blackstone 
Group’s efforts were beginning to come to fruition, the first REIT 
devoted to doing so emerged in the form of the Silver Bay Realty 
Trust Corporation, which at the very end of 2012 had an initial 
public offering of $300 million with a market capitalization of $709 
million.225  By the third quarter of the next year, 2013—just as 
Blackstone was issuing the Invitation Homes 2013-SFR 1 
product—Silver Bay, along with two other new REITs that were 
formed to compete with it, committed to spending over $600 billion 
on single-family housing stock.226  By 2014, these three REIT’s 
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alone had succeeding in acquiring some 33,000 units.227  On aver-
age, Silver Bay and the other two REITs are estimated to have 
spent five to ten thousand dollars on renovations per home, at a 
total cost of approximately seventy million dollars.228  Of course, 
very quickly, reports of poor quality renovation, upkeep, and 
exploitative landlord practices emerged as well, as they continue 
to do alongside various other concerns about profiteering on the 
disadvantaged.229   
Between the upsurge in REIT activity and the issuance of 
additional SFRBS offerings—for example, another by Colony Cap-
ital appeared in March 2014230—it was soon apparent that the 
market for investing in single-family rentals was a real one.  By 
May 2014, the San Francisco Federal Reserve Bank estimated 
that institutional players had purchased some 90,000 to 150,000 
properties, with fifteen to twenty billion dollars.231  Two years 
later, by January 2016, the San Francisco Fed reported that the 
seven largest institutional investors involved in the single-family 
REO business controlled some 170,000 units, concentrated, espe-
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Figure 8: Two Snapshots of the First SFRBS233 
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Within just four years, some one percent of the country’s four-
teen to fifteen million renter-occupied single-family properties had 
been absorbed, with the greatest number situated in the Phoenix 
area.234  Yet this likely underestimates the true significance.  
Other estimates, for example, point out that private equity firms 
have brought some untold additional number of homes into their 
single-family rental stock by making ongoing purchases through 
“proprietary software and algorithms” that “instantly bid on 
thousands of homes at auctions across the country,” thus crowding 
out ordinary purchasers.235  As various REITs have further gone 
public, now subjecting them to the further demands of equity 
owners demanding shareholder value, this additional form of 
securitization represents a major “paradigm shift for the single-
family rental market,” as the San Francisco Fed put it.236  Indeed, 
by February 2017, Invitation Homes transformed into the 
country’s biggest REIT specializing in single-family home pur-
chases, with its industry pioneer parent, the Blackstone Group, 
raising  “$1.54 billion in an initial public offering” for “77 million 
shares [priced] at $20 each.”237 
Moreover, after the first initially uncertain two years, SFRBS 
assets have now evolved into a hybrid between the earlier residen-
tial and commercial MBS, and the largely unregulated market is 
now even further blurring the line between rental- and mortgage-
backed securities.  In addition to so-called multi-borrower deals, 
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newer SFRBS products are now moving in the direction of pooling 
together real estate assets consisting of both the rental payments 
from the ever-increasing number of single-family homes that 
private equity firms are buying up and mortgage payments from 
ordinary owner-occupied homes.238 
C. Some Normative Alternatives 
One way to assess the normative dimension of the SFRBS 
might be from a perspective of the kind that scholars of securities, 
banking, and business law have devoted to earlier forms of securi-
tization.  However, one will quickly see that the lion’s share of such 
attention emerged only after the Great Recession, usually while 
looking back on the bursting of the housing bubble as the 
precipitating event.239  Given its relative novelty, however, the 
securitization of rental payments discussed in Part IV is yet to 
lend itself to such retrospective treatment.  As a result, the rise of 
the SFRBS is more likely to be comprehended in the way the up-
surge in MBS products was for much of the 1980s and 1990s.  That 
is, it is more likely to be viewed through the lens of technical 
questions about the structuring of the underlying deals that 
SFRBS products are built on.240 
Indeed, much as the RMBS was when the market for that 
product began to be ramped up in the late 1990s, the SFRBS to 
date has been normatively justified in the way securitization more 
generally has been: as a means of promoting liquidity241 in the 
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housing market, especially given the sharp contraction in mort-
gage lending after the crisis.242  Such justifications are also, as with 
the RMBS before, further burnished by the idea that securitization 
is a way of democratizing access to credit and mitigating past 
inequities in mortgage lending.243 
To close Part IV, therefore, I will make explicit the Article’s 
alternative framework for approaching the normative dimension 
of the SFRBS specifically and derivative financial asset property 
rooted in real estate value more generally.  The proposals made 
below are, taken on their own terms, quite mild.  However, they 
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may appear all the more bold and even politically feasible in light 
of the reasons discussed in the Introduction there are to think that 
we may be ready to leave behind the impulse that characterized 
the initial policy response to the Coronavirus shock that found us 
largely eschewing structural transformation—much as we did in 
the aftermath of the 2007 crisis—for measures that instead 
prioritized channeling free or low-cost money to large corporate 
and financial actors that have grown accustomed to financial asset 
price inflation as a modus operandi. 
1. Shifting Tax Burdens Back onto Real Estate and Capital 
Gains 
As I noted at the start of Part IV, the key policy question that 
the perspective from property-as-rent poses has to do with asking 
how socially useful it is to inflate real estate prices in the way our 
legal system has encouraged by providing tax breaks for accumu-
lating various kinds of real estate debt.  Given constraints of space, 
the reader can refer back to that earlier part of the discussion, 
which also made explicit the purpose of disaggregating residential 
real estate prices in the way I have in Section IV.A.  At the most 
basic normative level of proposing new policy options, therefore, 
the argument presented at the outset of Part IV stands.  Taxing 
the economic rent of land price inflation—as distinct from real 
estate price inflation based on rising costs of capital improvements 
and construction—thus merits serious attention.  This is espe-
cially important given the way tax policy at the local, state, and 
national levels has now for decades regressively shifted burdens 
off of real estate and asset price gains rooted in real estate—not to 
mention financial asset property more generally—and onto 
consumption and labor incomes by and of the parts of the 
population that have little accumulated wealth to tax in the first 
place.244 
2. Mis-accounting for Land Price Gains as Structure Cost 
Increases 
In addition to elements of our tax law that allow for the 
excessive depreciation of buildings, especially in the commercial 
real estate context, as noted earlier there is reason to think 
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predominant national income accounting practices overestimate 
the cost of maintaining and replacing built structures.245  As a 
result, the indirect method for inferring land price values by 
subtracting the replacement cost of structures from the price 
buyers pay for real estate in the market is liable to have an 
underestimating tendency.  Insofar as the land price component of 
real estate values is higher than our existing data suggests, 
therefore, modifying our accounting practices would add to the 
normative weight of the policy changes discussed in Section 
IV.C.1. 
3. Reframing the Justification from Promoting Liquidity 
From the overall perspective this Article has elaborated from 
Part I to Part IV, how does the default justification of securiti-
zation—and financial asset property rooted in real estate value 
more generally—fare?246  Is there a way to critically assess the jus-
tification of promoting liquidity or democratizing credit without 
retrospection affording us the luxury of knowing that securiti-
zation has evidently exposed the economy to too much systemic 
risk?  What does the SFRBS look like if it is instead surveyed from 
the standpoint of a conception of property-as-rent that is as au-
thentic to western legal and economic thinking about the right to 
property as any other?  In this final segment of Section IV.C, I 
discuss the normative dimension of securitization in this more 
abstract sense. 
Of course, one may here feel it appropriate to draw a 
seemingly important distinction between the residential MBS and 
the SFRBS.  This is because when assessed at the level of the home 
as a tangible physical shelter, it may appear that the mortgage 
payments comprising the revenue streams making the RMBS 
possible are fundamentally different from the rental payments 
making the SFRBS possible.  Indeed, one might even be willing to 
reflexively grant a weak form of the case against the argument of 
promoting liquidity or democratizing credit in the context of the 
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SFRBS—say, by deeming it vaguely extractive—in exact propor-
tion to one’s more considered unwillingness to do so in the other, 
given the equity building payments that seem to support the 
RMBS—this is especially the case insofar as RMBS remain an 
important part of the landscape of financial property.  Yet there 
are a number of problems, both empirical and theoretical, with 
going only so far as we would be allowed by a mere weak case 
against the normative argument of promoting liquidity or democ-
ratizing credit. 
First, at the empirical level, given the more than six trillion 
dollars in equity capital and wealth that vanished in the wake of 
the 2006–2007 crisis, it is evidently not so easy to draw a line 
between equity-building payments and extractive landlord pay-
ments.247  Second, even without referring to the disappearance of 
Main Street’s illusory capital amidst the great unwinding of the 
post-2006 era, as Section IV.A shows so vividly, many—and even-
tually most—mortgage payments must be seen as servicing 
scarcity premiums that derive from land rather than directly 
building the equity of the ordinary consumer’s portfolio.  While 
this would not necessarily be too striking to observers in the 
eighteenth century, it surely should be to us today, long after the 
conception of property-as-rent has largely been lost. 
What of the problems at the theoretical level with making only 
a weak case against the normative argument from promoting 
liquidity or democratizing credit, by making some kind of distinc-
tion between the SFRBS and RMBS?  Here, the last observation—
about the empirical importance of what Section IV.A demonstrates 
about land’s site value—must be understood as also having 
evident theoretical implications.  Indeed, as much is made clear by 
the very conception of property-as-rent.  Less obviously, it is also 
necessary to consider how more precisely we should understand 
the role of housing as an asset that exists under the right to 
property.  The idea that RMBS bonds are predicated on equity-
building payments in a way that distinguishes them from SFRBS 
payments is thus true only to the extent that one limits one’s 
perspective in a very particular way.  That is, it is true only to the 
extent that housing’s role as property is thought to be fully 
determined by asking who owns a house in its capacity as a tangi-
ble shelter, together with the direct equity value such ownership 
ostensibly permits to that owner.  Yet there are clearly other—and 
 
247 Landy, supra note 38, at 2. 
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relative to the larger anonymous forces of the global economy, 
more important—ways that housing is converted into property. 
Indeed, coming full circle to where the Article began, every kind 
of securitization of underlying housing assets demonstrates that 
the homeowner’s “right to exclude” or even “right to exclusively de-
termine use” does not really entail any such thing.  In other words, 
it is not up to the homeowner whether her house is to be excluded 
from being made into debt-based financial asset property belong-
ing to an investment fund.  Indeed, such varieties of use determi-
nation are made in complete defiance of whatever the owner may 
want to the contrary.  Instead, various other kinds of use determina-
tion will have evidently been taking place simultaneously by the 
legal system’s ability to fashion and distribute even the most 
seemingly non-bundle-like object as just some additional stick in 
some other institutional investor’s own bundle—or, even, as just 
some additional stick in some other institutional investor’s own 
stick that is, itself, part of still some other institutional investor’s 
own bundle, as in the case of the CMO as distinct from the RMBS.  
Ultimately, then, even if we all decided to say that a house’s owner 
held the real “thing” she owned so unitarily as to effectively em-
body the caricature of the Blackstonian “sole dominion” holder, 
which no theorist today actually endorses, their right to property 
would still not consist of any right of exclusive use determination 
let alone absolute exclusion of whatever other kind. 
Finally, and still at the theoretical level, the weak case against 
the argument of promoting liquidity or democratizing credit that nor-
matively underpins the SFRBS, and securitization more generally, 
does not go far enough, because we should not be confused by 
semantics.  In other words, the underlying payment streams that 
support the SFRBS are not “rent” because they fail to build equity 
in the way that the mortgage payments that underlie the RMBS 
propose to be.  Nor, indeed, do the mortgage payments that under-
lie the RMBS capture “rent” only when a crisis induces a collapse 
of trillions of dollars in apparent equity.  Rather, when considering 
the normative argument for financial innovation that is rooted in 
the idea of promoting liquidity or democratizing credit, we must 
ask whether command over the payments that support both the 
SFRBS and RMBS amounts to a form of property-as-rent for at 
least three other reasons: (1) because of the possibility that they 
service debt that is making claims on future incomes that would 
otherwise derive from production and productive investment; 
(2) because much of that debt is, itself, built on real estate lending 
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as the historically largest source of debt in the economy more 
generally; and (3) because of how much of the real estate debt 
alluded to under item (2) is, itself, really based on lending against 
the scarcity premiums of land rather than produced structures. 
CONCLUSION 
Through a method that has been, by turns, analytical, histori-
cal, and empirical, this Article has sought to contribute to ongoing 
debate about the nature of, and the right to, property in law.  Its 
central argument has been that there is a long-standing concep-
tion of property-as-rent that has remained too long neglected, 
whether by those who offer object-centered views, focusing on 
property’s exclusionary aspect, or those who privilege “propriety,” 
and thus property’s social or communitarian rather than econom-
ic, preference satisfying, and commoditarian aspect. 
In clarifying the roots of the alternative conception of property-
as-rent going back to the work of the leading classical economists, 
and really before, this Article has also emphasized the importance 
of this conception to the early legal or institutionalist economists 
during the Progressive Era in the United States and their inheri-
tors.  Being more than just an exercise in legal history, however, 
this Article has put this alternative conception into dialogue with 
the reality of our post-1970 political economy in order to demon-
strate the ongoing importance of legal forms that permit an 
identity between land, the right to property, and the control of 
economic rent.  As this Article has sought to demonstrate empir-
ically, this is because scarcity premiums associated with the land 
price component of home price values in the market for residential 
real estate remain central to the ongoing proliferation of various 
new forms of debt-based financial ownership claims on society’s 
productive resources.  Using the example of one such new form—
the SFRBS—this Article ultimately uses all three of its perspec-
tives—analytical, historical, and empirical—to make a normative 
case against renewing our reliance on exotic varieties of real estate 
securitization, which continue to be justified mainly based on the 
argument of democratizing credit. 
After the Great Recession, in an age when “[s]tretched [a]sset 
[p]rices succumbing to [g]ravity” had become a question of when 
rather than if well before the Coronavirus shock would again precipi-
tate a crisis of world-historical proportions for American and global 
capitalism, it was already hazardous to sit content waiting for the 
distance of retrospection to begin saying “we should have known 
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better.”248  To continue doing so now—after the intensifed financiali-
zation of real estate has subsisted side by side with a mounting crisis 
of affordabilty and increased calls to decommodify the provision of 
shelter, after not one but two proverbial black swans have ap-
peared in a period of barely ten years, and after the first real signs 
in decades of a more fundametnal possible shift being afoot in our 
political economic priorities—would simply be inexcusable.249 
 
248 Reid et al., supra note 39, at 28–52. 
249 NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, THE BLACK SWAN: THE IMPACT OF THE HIGHLY IM-
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